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Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by Rosemary T. Cakmis"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the passage of almost two decades since the enactment of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G."), issues relating to the
sentencing guidelines continue to dominate Eleventh Circuit case law.
This is no doubt due, at least in part, to the fact that by 2003, the
guidelines had been amended 662 times.'
Ambiguities within the guidelines regularly lead to differing interpretations of those guidelines among the circuit courts of appeals. These
differing interpretations result in further guideline amendments aimed
at reconciling the splits among the circuits. The amended guidelines
result in new issues of first impression, new interpretations, and new
splits among the circuits. The guidelines are amended again, and the
cycle continues.
The year 2003 was just another chapter in this continuing saga. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was confronted
with several issues of first impression that related in large part to
guideline amendments. Many of the amendments became effective in
2001 but did not begin to surface in reported decisions until 2003.

* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division.
University of Florida (B.S., 1979; J.D., 1981). National Delegate, Orlando Chapter of the
Federal Bar Association; Chairperson, Federal Judicial Relations Committee; Secretary,
Central Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Liaison Bar Member, Steering
Committee for Case Management/Electronic Case File Project of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida; Serves on the Ninth Circuit Grievance Committee
for the Florida Bar and the Middle District of Florida Grievance Committee in Orlando.
Member, State Bar of Florida; United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida; Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals; and the United States Supreme Court. Ms.
Cakmis is board certified by The Florida Bar in the field of criminal appellate law.
1. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2003).
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B: GENERAL APPLICATION PRINCIPLES
General application principles, such as relevant conduct and retroactive guideline amendments, were addressed in several Eleventh Circuit
cases in 2003. Recent guideline amendments, especially Amendment
599,2 resulted in decisions of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.
Although the substance of these decisions may be more relevant to the
particular guideline at issue, the procedural aspects and some of the
general principles of the cases are discussed here.
II.

CHAPTER ONE, PART

U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.3: Relevant Conduct
U.S.S.G. section 1B1.3 allows courts to consider relevant conduct in
calculating a defendant's sentencing guidelines.3 United States v.
Hunter4 demonstrates the concept of reasonable foreseeability in the
context of fraud conspiracy loss.5 Defendants in Hunter were three of
nineteen runners who presented themselves to banks and cashed
counterfeit checks.6 The three defendants cashed checks totaling less
than $15,000. However, the sentencing court held them accountable for
the total actual loss from the entire scheme, which was approximately
$125,000. The court reasoned that it was reasonably foreseeable to
defendants, as participants in a counterfeit check ring, that they
participated in a scheme that entailed more than their own individual
the court enhanced
conduct. Thus, under U.S.S.G. section 2F1.1,
7
A.

defendants' sentence based on a $125,000 loss.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in its attribution of the entire loss amount to the defendants.8 The court pointed out
that under the relevant conduct guideline, a sentencing court must
determine the scope of the criminal activity the defendant undertook
before reaching the matter of reasonable foreseeability.9 In this regard,

2.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 599 (2003).

3.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2001).

4.

323 F.3d 1314 (lth

Cir. 2003).

5. The court in Hunter used the 1998 version of the guidelines. Id. at 1316 n.1.
6. Id. at 1316-17. Defendants in Hunter were convicted of "conspiracy to make, utter,
and possess counterfeit checks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371." Id. at 1316.
7. Id. at 1318 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (1998)). Hunter
is also discussed in the sections of this Article relating to minor role (U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2), at infra notes 415-32 and criminal history calculations (U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2), at infra notes 528-52.
8. The court found that certain activity may or may not indicate an implicit agreement
regarding other checks, so it remanded the case for "particularized findings" as to the
extent of the agreement. 323 F.3d at 1321-22.
9. Id. at 1320.
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the sentencing court should consider "'any explicit agreement or implicit
agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and
others.'" 10 However, the court cautioned that a defendant's knowledge
of a larger operation and agreement to perform a particular act do not
constitute "acquiescence in the acts of the criminal enterprise as a
whole."" Rather, the government must present "evidence of sharing or
mutuality from which an agreement in the larger criminal scheme can
be inferred."12 The court held that the government in Hunter failed to
produce such evidence.'" Additionally, one defendant, who joined the
conspiracy after certain acts had been committed, could not be held
accountable for
conduct that occurred prior to his entry into the criminal
14
undertaking.
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed relevant conduct and reasonable
foreseeability in United States v. Pringle.15 Defendant in Pringle was
convicted in 1991 of conspiracy to commit a burglary and six robberies,
some of which involved the use of firearms, in violation of the Hobbs
Act,16 robbery of the Liberty Savings Bank, and use of a firearm during
the robbery of the Liberty Savings Bank. 7 The co-defendants used
firearms during the robberies involved in the conspiracy, and the
conspiracy base offense level was enhanced due to the use of those
firearms. However, the use of a firearm during the Liberty Savings
Bank robbery did not result in any enhancement. After the passage of
Amendment 599, defendant sought a reduction of his sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 15 The district court denied the motion. 19
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit addressed two questions. 20 First,
defendant argued that the district court miscalculated his original
sentence when it considered acts committed by the co-conspirators that

10. Id. at 1319-20 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2
(1998)).
11. Id. at 1320.
12. Id. at 1322.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1320 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2 (1998)
("A defendant's relevant conduct does not include the conduct of members of a conspiracy
prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy, even if the defendant knows of that
conduct")).
15. 350 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 2003).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1990).
17. 350 F.3d at 1174-75. The district court relied on 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (2000)
and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) for the convictions stemming from the robbery of the Liberty
Savings Bank. Id. at 1175.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2000).
19. 350 F.3d at 1175.
20. Id. at 1174.
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were not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, contrary to U.S.S.G.
section 1B1.3. 2' Second, defendant argued that even if the acts were
reasonably foreseeable, his sentence should have been reduced retroactively based on Amendment 599.22 The court in Pringle set forth a
three-part analysis for determining whether the defendant "should be
held accountable for his co-conspirators['] possession of a firearm during
the robberies that formed the basis of [defendant's] conspiracy conviction." 23 Specifically, it must be determined
(1) if [defendant] was part of a jointly undertaken criminal activity,
whether or not charged as a conspiracy; (2) whether the acts of
[defendant's] co-conspirators that took place after the robbery of
Liberty Savings Bank were reasonably foreseeable to [defendant;]...
[and if so] (3) whether Amendment 599 retroactively bars punishment
for these acts.24
As to the first prong of the test, the district court and the Eleventh
Circuit agreed that there was sufficient evidence in the record to uphold
the jury's guilty verdict on the conspiracy count, which established that
the 5 defendant was a knowing and willful participant in the conspira2
cy.
The second prong-reasonable foreseeability-was established by the
facts that defendant knew the full scope of his co-conspirators' unlawful
enterprise, including the fact that weapons were used, well before he
joined the conspiracy.26 The court also noted that
[tihe issue of whether [defendant] was involved in the planning or
execution of the offenses for which he received a weapons enhancement
is wholly separate from the issue of whether [defendant] could have
reasonably foreseen that his co-conspirators would commit ... subsequent offenses, and do so using firearms.2
Having affirmed the district court's findings that defendant was part
of a jointly undertaken criminal activity and that the co-conspirators' use
of weapons was reasonably foreseeable to defendant, the Eleventh

21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 1176.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1176-77.
26. Id. at 1178.
27. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2 (2002) ("the
criminal activity that the defendant agreed to jointly undertake, and the reasonably
foreseeable conduct of others in furtherance of that criminal activity, are not necessarily
identical")).
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Circuit turned to the applicability of Amendment 599, which was "a
matter of statutory interpretation and an issue of first impression in this
circuit."28 As discussed in the next section of this Article, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the district court properly rejected the Amendment
599 argument because the defendant "received weapons enhancements
only in connection with the robberies for which he did not receive 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions."29
B. U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.10: Sentence Reductions Based on Amended
Guidelines
U.S.S.G. section 1B1.10(a) provides that
"[wihere a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the
guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been
lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual listed
in subsection (c) below, a reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)."' 0
Section 3582(c)(2) "allows a sentencing court to reduce a prisoner's term
of imprisonment, consistent with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), where the defendant has been sentenced pursuant to a
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 944(o). "31
Pringle was one of three Eleventh Circuit decisions published in 2003
that concerned an appeal from the denial of a motion to reduce a
sentence filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).12 All three cases-United
States v.Pringle,"3 United States v. Brown,3 4 and United States v.
Armstrong,3 5-agreed that Amendment 599 could be applied retroactively inasmuch as it was listed in U.S.S.G. section 1B1.10(c). 36 The
court in Pringle explained: "Amendment 599 was enacted to clarify
under what circumstances a weapons enhancement may be applied to an

28. Id. at 1176.
29. Id. at 1181.
30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(a) (2002). The amendments listed
in section 1B1.10(c) are 126, 130, 156, 176, 269, 329, 341, 371, 379, 380, 433, 454, 461, 484,
488, 490, 499, 505, 506, 516, 591, 599, 606. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.10(c) (2002).
31. Pringle, 350 F.3d at 1176 n.5.
32. Id. at 1174.
33. 350 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 2003).
34. 332 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2003).
35. 347 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2003).

36. Pringle,350 F.3d at 1178-81; Brown, 332 F.3d at 1343-46; Armstrong, 347 F.3d at
907-09.
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underlying offense when the defendant has also received an 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)[37] conviction, which provides separate punishment for the use
or possession of a firearm in a violent crime." 38 Because that amendment is "commentary that interprets or explains a sentencing guideline,
it is binding on federal courts."3 9 Of course, whether a sentence
reduction is warranted in each case depends on the facts of each case,
which is discussed in more detail in connection with the guideline
amended by Amendment 599, U.S.S.G. section 2K2.4.4 °
Because the defendant in Armstrong also sought application of two
other amendments-Amendments 600 and 635, the court went into more
detail on the procedural aspects of § 3582(c)(2) motions."' As an initial
matter, the district court in Armstrong ruled that defendant's § 3582
(c)(2) motion was not a successive habeas petition and was therefore not
affected by the fact that defendant had previously filed unsuccessful
motions for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.42 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that "'the existence
of prior motions to amend the sentence is ... not a bar to a motion
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).'"'
The court in Armstrong then noted that for a sentence to be retroactively reduced under section 3582(c)(2), two requirements must be
met.44 First, there must be an amendment to the sentencing guidelines
that would result in a guideline range lower than the range upon which
the defendant was originally sentenced. 45 Second,
the amendment
46
must be listed under U.S.S.G. section 1B1.10(c).
Because Amendment 600 was not listed in section 1Bl.10(c), the
Eleventh Circuit found that the district court was correct in refusing to
reduce defendant's sentence based on that guideline. 47 Amendment
599, on the other hand, was listed in section 1B1.10(c) and therefore
qualified as an amendment for reduction purposes. 4' However, the

37. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000).
38. Pringle,350 F.3d at 1176 (citing United States v. White, 305 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th
Cir. 2002)); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C, amend. 599 at 70
(2002)).

39. Pringle, 350 F.3d at 1179 (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993)).
40. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.4 (2000).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Armstrong, 347 F.3d at 907-09.
Id. at 907; see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 907-08.
Id. at 908.
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Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Amendment
599 did not apply factually in this case because defendant's "'sentence
imposed on the
underlying offenses was not affected by [his] possession
49
of firearms.'"
The bulk of the opinion in Armstrong focused on Amendment 635.' 0
Although Amendment 635 is not listed in section iBl.10(c), defendant
argued that it should be applied retroactively because it was a clarifying
amendment that was passed to clarify the commentary of U.S.S.G.
section 3B1.2, and Eleventh Circuit precedent holds that clarifying
amendments are retroactive.51 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
defendant that Amendment 635 was a clarifying amendment, noting that
by definition, "'[cilarifying amendments do not effect a substantive
change, but provide persuasive evidence of how the Sentencing
Commission originally envisioned application of the relevant guideline.'"5 2 Indeed, as the court noted, Amendment 635 has been applied
retroactively when raised on direct appeal.5" However, the court noted
that the cases applying clarifying amendments retroactively had
occurred in the context of a direct appeal or a post-conviction petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.' "While consideration of Amendment 635 as
a clarifying amendment may be necessary in the direct appeal of a
sentence or in a petition under § 2255, it bears no relevance to determining retroactivity under § 3582(c)(2)." 5' Section 3582(c)(2) is "a limited
and narrow exception to the rule that final judgments are not to be
modified."56 That exception applies only when the "sentence of imprisonment was 'based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission' and §3582(b)."57
The court in Armstrong joined several of its sister circuits in adopting
a "bright-line rule that amendments claimed in § 3582(c)(2) motions may
be retroactively applied solely where expressly listed under §1B1.10

49. Id.
50. Id. at 908-09.
51. Id. at 908 (citing, e.g., United States v. Anderton, 136 F.3d 747, 751 (11th Cir.
1998); United States v. Howard, 923 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Marin, 916 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204,
1215 (11th Cir. 1989)).
52. Id. at 908 n.7 (quoting Burke v. United States, 152 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir.
1998)).
53. Id. (citing United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002)).
54. Id. at 908.
55. Id. at 908-09.
56. Id. at 909.
57. Id.
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(c)." s The Eleventh Circuit also agreed with those circuits that had
specifically held that clarifying amendments were not an exception to
this rule and could only be retroactively applied on direct appeal of a
sentence or under a § 2255 motion.59
III.

A.

CHAPTER Two:

OFFENSE CONDUCT

PartA: Offenses Against the Person

1. U.S.S.G. Section 2A3.2. In two cases in 2003, the Eleventh
Circuit was called upon to decide which guideline to apply to convictions
under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)60 for using the mail or other means of
interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a
minor "to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any
61
person can be charged with a criminal offense," or attempt to do so.
The sentencing calculations for a § 2422(b) conviction begin with
U.S.S.G. section 2G1.1 (Promoting A Commercial Sex Act or Prohibited
Sexual Conduct). 62 Section 2G1.1(c)(3), the cross-referencing provision,
states:
If the offense did not involve promoting prostitution, and neither
subsection (c)(1) nor (c)(2) is applicable, apply § 2A3.2 (Criminal Sexual
Abuse of a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen Years (Statutory Rape) or
Attempt to Commit Such Acts) or § 2A3.4 (Abusive Sexual Contact or
Attempt to Commit Abusive Sexual Contact), as appropriate.'

58. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 1997); United States
v. Wyatt, 115 F.3d 606, 608-09 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Drath, 89 F.3d 216, 218
(5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 1995); United States
v. Dullen, 15 F.3d 68, 70-71 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Avila, 997 F.2d 767, 768 (10th
Cir. 1993).
59. Armstrong, 347 F.3d at 909 (citing Drath, 89 F.3d at 217; Lee v. United States, 221
F.3d 1335 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished decision)). The court in Armstrong found that the
same ruling applied to defendant's attempt to assert a request for a reduction of sentence
under Amendment 500, which became effective on November 1, 1993. That amendment
was not listed in § 1B1.10(c), but it had been determined to be a clarifying amendment.
Id. at 909 n.9. The defendant did not assert Amendment 500 in his original § 3582(c)(2)
motion, but sought to amend it after he had filed his appeal. The district court found that
it lacked jurisdiction to review the request to amend the § 3582(c)(2) motion because the
appeal had already been filed. Id. The Eleventh Circuit specifically stated that its holding
applied to that amendment as well. Id.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2000).
61. Id.
62. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A (2001).
63. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G1.1(c)(3) (2001).
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The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Panfi64 addressed the
difference between sexual acts, which invoke the harsher section 2A3.2,
and sexual contact, which invokes section 2A3.4. The crucial question
in Panfil was whether defendant's conduct-setting up a meeting with
a law enforcement officer, who was posing as a minor girl, in an attempt
to engage in oral sex with a minor--constituted an attempted sexual act
or attempted sexual contact.65 To determine definitions of a sexual act
and sexual contact, the court turned to 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) and (3) as
the guideline commentary instructed.6 6 Sexual act means "(B) contact
between... the mouth and the vulva... (D) the intentional touching,
not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not
attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person."67 Sexual
contact means "the intentional touching, either directly or through the
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of
any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.""
Based on these definitions, the court held that by attempting to have
oral sex with a minor, defendant in Panfil attempted a "sexual act," as
opposed to "sexual contact." 9 The court also noted that there was no
conflict between sections 2A3.2 and 2A3.4 because
the latter guideline
70
excludes any conduct that is a "sexual act."
The court also rejected the argument that the guideline for "sexual
acts" could not apply because it required a showing that the defendant
"unduly influenced" the victim, and here the victim was an undercover
law enforcement officer who was not influenced. 71 "In § 2A3.2, 'victim'
is a term of art, defined in Commentary Note 1 to include either 'an
individual who ... had not attained the age of 16 years' or 'an undercover law enforcement officer who represented to a participant that the
officer had not attained the age of 16 years.' 72 The court noted that
in evaluating "undue influence" when the "victim" is a law enforcement

64. 338 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2003).
65. Id. at 1300, 1302.
66. Id. at 1302 (referring to section 2A3.2, cmt. n.1 (2001)).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) (2000).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) (2000).
69. 338 F.3d at 1302-03.
70. Id. at 1303.
71. Id. at 1303-04.
72. Id. at 1303 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.2, cmt. n.1
(2001)).
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officer, the court focuses on the conduct of the offender. v3 Hence, the
court held that the district court did not err in applying U.S.S.G. section
2A3.2 to compute Panfil's sentence.74
Likewise, in United States v. Miranda,75 the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that section 2A3.2 applied to defendant's conduct of using a computer to
attempt to persuade a minor to engage in criminal sexual conduct.7 6
In reversing the district court's application of section 2A3.4, the Eleventh
Circuit discussed, at length, defendant's communications via the Internet
with two police officers posing as twelve- and thirteen-year-old females,
wherein defendant asked one would-be minor if she wanted to have sex
and told the other would-be minor how to have sex. 7 According to the
Eleventh Circuit: "The only reasonable construction of Miranda's words
...
is that he wanted to have sexual intercourse with [the persons he
believed were minor girls], and,
therefore, Miranda's conduct consisted
78
of an attempted sexual act."
In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit compared this case to Panfil, which
was decided three months before Miranda.79 Two differences were
noted by the Eleventh Circuit.80 First, there was even more evidence
concerning Miranda's conduct than there was regarding Panfil's
conduct.8 ' Second, different versions of section 2A3.2 were applied in
the two cases.12 "Panfiladdressed the 2001 version of § 2A3.2, whereas
Miranda was sentenced under the 2000 version of§ 2A3.2. Although the
two versions of § 2A3.2 contain substantively different components,
Panfil'sdiscussion of the definition of 'sexual act' is 3still relevant because
the definition of 'sexual act' remains unchanged."
The other issue in Miranda, an issue of first impression in the
Eleventh Circuit, concerned the application of U.S.S.G. section 2A3.2(b)
(2)(A)(i), which provides for a two-level specific offense enhancement if
"'the offense involved the knowing misrepresentation of a participant's
[identity] to ... persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the victim to engage

73. Id. (citing United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002)).
74. Id. at 1304.
75. 348 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2003).
76. Id. at 1332. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The 2000 edition of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines was applied because Miranda committed the offense on October 30,
2001, two days before the effective date of the 2001 guidelines. 348 F.3d at 1323 n.1.
77. Id. at 1326-30.
78. Id. at 1331.
79. Id. at 1332; Panfil, 338 F.3d at 1303.
80. Miranda, 348 F.3d at 1332.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1332 n.11.
83. Id.
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in prohibited sexual conduct.'" 4 The commentary explains that the
person's identity includes his name, age, occupation, gender, or status
"'with the intent to

. .

. persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the victim to

engage in prohibitedsexual conduct.'"85
The Government in Miranda appealed the district court's refusal to
apply this enhancement based on defendant's misrepresentation of his
age.88 During his online exchanges, Miranda stated that he was thirtyfive years old, whereas he was actually forty years old.87 The Government claimed that Miranda's understatement of his age was material
because it was intended to improve his chances of having sex. s
Noting that defendant told the arresting officers the wrong age at the
time of arrest, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not
clearly err in holding that the defendant did not intend to induce a
meeting by misrepresenting his age, even though the district court could
have as easily reached the contrary conclusion.8 9 Because of this
finding, the court stated that it did not need to reach the issue of
whether the five-year misrepresentation was material. 9
2. U.S.S.G. Section 2A4.1: Kidnapping, Abduction, Unlawful
Restraint. In United States v. Torrealba,9" defendant was convicted
of conspiracy to commit hostage taking,92 substantive hostage taking,93 and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence,94 based on the kidnapping of a woman and her two
children.95 In sentencing the defendant to 220 months of imprisonment
on the hostage taking counts,9" the district court applied two enhancements found in U.S.S.G. section 2A4.1-one for an inchoate ransom

84. Id. at 1333 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.2(b)(2)(A)(i)
See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.4(b)(4)(A) (2000)
(2000)).

(containing similar language).
85. Miranda,348 F.3d at 1333 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.2,
cmt. n.5 (2000) (emphasis supplied by court)). See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2A3.4, cmt. n.6 (2000) (containing similar language).
86. Miranda, 348 F.3d at 1333-34.
87. Id. at 1333.
88. Id.
89. Id.

90. Id. at 1334.
91. 339 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2003).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2000).
93. See id.
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000).
95. 339 F.3d at 1239-40.
96. A 60-month consecutive sentence was imposed on the section 924(c) count. 339 F.3d
at 1241 n.4.
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demand under U.S.S.G. section 2A4.1(b)(1) 9' and one for permanent
injury from beating under U.S.S.G. section 2A4.1(b)(2)(A).9 8
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the six-level ransom demand enhancement even though no demand was made.9 9 Relying on Eleventh Circuit
precedent'00 and guideline commentary,1° ' the court in Torrealba
observed that the ransom enhancement is appropriate if it can be said
with "reasonable certainty" that a ransom demand would have been
made but for the defendant's capture. 102
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected defendant's argument that the
district court should have applied the two-level enhancement found in
section 2A4.1(b)(2)(B) for serious bodily injuries, rather than the fourlevel enhancement found in section 2A4. 1(b)(2)(A) for "permanent or lifethreatening bodily injur[ies]."0's Relying on the guideline's definitions
of the terms "serious bodily injury" and "permanent or life-threatening
bodily injury,"0 4 the court determined that because of the use of the

97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A4.1(b)(1) provides that "'[i]f a ransom
demand or a demand upon government was made, increase by 6 levels.'" Torrealba,339
F.3d at 1241 n.7 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A4.1(b)(1) (2002)).
98. Id. at 1240-41. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A4.1(b)(2) provides: "(A)
If the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, increase by 4 levels; (B)
if the victim sustained serious bodily injury, increase by 2 levels; or (C) if the degree of
injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), increase by 3 levels.'" Id. at
1241 n.8 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A4.1(b)(2) (2002)).
99. Id. at 1243-44.
100. United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020 (11th Cir. 2001).
101. Specifically, Application Note Five to § 2A4.1 states that "[i]n the case of a
conspiracy, attempt, or solicitation to kidnap, § 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation or Conspiracy)
requires that the court apply any adjustment that can be determined with reasonable
certainty." 339 F.3d at 1244 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A4.1, cmt.
n.5 (2002)).
102. Id. at 1244-45.
103. Id. at 1245-46.
104. The court in Torrealbaobserved that the application notes to § 2A4.1 provide that
"'[diefinitions of "serious bodily injury" and "permanent or life-threatening bodily injury"
are found in the Commentary to § 1B1.1.'" Id. at 1246 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A4.1, cmt. n.1 (2002)). The commentary to § 1B1.1 then defines
these terms as follows:
"Permanent or life-threatening bodily injury" means injury involving a substantial
risk of death; loss or substantial impairment of the function of a bodily member,
organ, or mental faculty that is likely to be permanent; or an obvious disfigurement that is likely to be permanent. In the case of a kidnapping, for example,
maltreatment to a life-threatening degree (e.g., by denial of food or medical care)
would constitute life-threatening bodily injury.
Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(g) (2002)).
"Serious bodily injury" means injury involving extreme physical pain or the
protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty;
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disjunctive in describing permanent or life threatening injuries, the fourlevel enhancement could be applied if the injuries were permanent, but
not "'terribly severe.'"'0 ° In this case the victim's "treating physician
opined that her facial symmetry will never be the same as it was prior
to the attack and that the nerve damage and scarring she suffered are
likely permanent." 106 These10 7facts were deemed sufficient to warrant
the four-level enhancement.
B. Part B: Basic Economic Offenses (IncludingFormer Part F:
Offenses Involving Fraud or Deceit)
U.S.S.G. section 1B1.11 requires the sentencing court to use the
edition of the sentencing guidelines manual that is in effect on the date
of sentencing, unless that version would violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause,' 8 in which case the court should use the edition that is in
effect on the day the offense of conviction was committed.' °9 Thus,
even though U.S.S.G. section 2F1.1 was deleted and its provisions were
consolidated into the amended version of section 2B1.1 in November
various aspects of section 2F1.1 continued to appear in
2001,"1
Eleventh Circuit decisions in 2003.1" Because Chapter Two of the
guidelines no longer contains Part F (Offenses Involving Fraud or
Deceit), and because the cases involving section 2F1.1 are now relevant
to guideline calculations under section 2B 1.1, the 2003 cases addressing
section 2F1. 1 are discussed below in connection with Chapter Two, Part
B (Basic Economic Offenses).
1. U.S.S.G. Sections 2B1.1 and 2F1.1: Loss Calculations. The
general rules for determining fraud loss in conspiracy cases are
discussed at length in connection with the relevant conduct guide113
line-U.S.S.G. section 1B1.3112-and United States v. Hunter.

or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical
rehabilitation. In addition, "serious bodily injury" is deemed to have occurred if
the offense involved conduct constituting criminal sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2241 or § 2242 or any similar offense under state law.
Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.1, cmt. n.1(i) (2002)).
105. Id. at 1246 (quoting United States v. Price, 149 F.3d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1998)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
109. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11 (2002).
110. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2001); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2001).

111.
112.
113.

See infra notes 112-40.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2001).
323 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003), discussed supra at section II.A. of this Article.
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Nonetheless, at least one important part of the Hunter holding bears
repeating here because it clarifies the correlation between responsibility
for the loss resulting from the fraudulent scheme and knowledge of the
scheme."' As explained in Hunter, "[aippellants' mere awareness that
[a co-conspirator] was involved in a much larger scheme is not enough
115
to hold them accountable for the activities of the entire conspiracy."
Thus, a defendant cannot be held accountable for the entire loss caused
by all acts of all of the members of a fraud ring just because that
defendant knew he was part of the operation. 116 "[T]he Guidelines
establish that the fact that the defendant knows about the larger
operation, and has agreed to perform a particular act, does not amount
to acquiescence in the acts of the criminal enterprise as a whole."" 7
Rather, the court must "'first determine the scope1 1of
the criminal
8
activity [the defendants] agreed to jointly undertake.'
The Eleventh Circuit discussed other aspects of loss calculations in
two other cases in 2003-United States v. Yeager," 9 which addressed
fraud loss calculations under U.S.S.G. section 2F1.1,120 and United
States v. Machado,'2 1 which discussed theft loss calculations under
U.S.S.G. section 2B1.1.122
In Yeager defendant was convicted of mail fraud offenses related to
distributing pharmaceuticals. 2 ' Defendant had a restricted right to
distribute the pharmaceuticals, but he fraudulently diverted that
product to non-authorized buyers. The sentencing court enhanced
defendant's sentence based on a loss estimate of $687,000, which
represented defendant's profits on sales of drugs to unauthorized
purchasers.'2 4
Noting that "'[l]oss is the value of the money, property, or services
unlawfully taken,"125 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the "money,

114. Id. at 1319.
115. Id. at 1321.
116. Id. at 1320.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2 (1998)).
119. 331 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). In Yeager the court vacated its prior March 12,
2003 opinion, 2003 WL 1056598, and substituted a new opinion on May 29, 2003, although
it did not change the sentencing portion of its opinion. Id. at 13.
120. The court in Yeager used the 2000 version of the guidelines to avoid ex post facto
concerns. Id. at 1224 n.2.
121. 333 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2003).
122. The court in Machado used the 2000 edition of the guidelines. Id. at 1226.
123. 331 F.3d at 1219.
124. Id. at 1224-25.
125. Id. at 1225 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1, cmt. n.8
(2000)).
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property, or services" that were "unlawfully taken" in this case were
"distribution privileges."' 26 Specifically, the court held that because
defendant secretly acted as an unrestricted distributor of a drug, even
though he had only been granted a restricted distribution right to
certain low-price markets, the proper measure of fraud loss was the
value of defendant's "theft" from the drug supplier of an unrestricted
distribution right. 12' Because the court concluded that the value was
the equivalent of the profits made by defendant, the $687,000 the
defendant had made in wrongful profits was a reasonable estimate of the
loss (i.e., an estimate of what the supplier could have
received but for
12
the fraudulent middleman status of the defendant).
29
The decision in Machado focused on theft loss calculations.
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 2B1.l(b)(1), the defendant's base offense
level in a theft case is increased based on the amount of the loss
occasioned by the stolen property involved in the offense.3 0
The
commentary to section 2B1.1 defines loss as "'the value of the property
taken, damaged, or destroyed.'"' 8 ' The commentary goes on to explain
that
"[o]rdinarily, when property is taken ... the loss is the fair market
value of the particular property at issue. Where the market value is
difficult to ascertain or inadequate to measure harm to the victim, the
court may measure loss 1in3 2some other way, such as reasonable replacement cost to the victim.
However, neither the guideline nor the commentary address whether the
market value should be measured by the wholesale or the retail
value. 133 Thus, the court in Machado confronted a question of first
impression in the Eleventh Circuit regarding the theft loss calculation,
that is, "whether district courts in applying U.S.S.G. § 2B1.L(b)(1) should
measure the loss at the retail value or at the loss to the person from
whom the goods were stolen[,]" which was the wholesale cost in this
case. 134

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
§ 2B1.1,
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 1225-26.
Id.
333 F.3d at 1226-28.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2000).
Machado, 333 F.3d at 1227 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
cmt. n.2 (2000)).
Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n2 (2000)).
Id.

134. Id. at 1226. Defendant in Machado pleaded guilty to conspiracy to receive stolen
goods related to the theft of a trailer containing approximately 132,000 pieces of women's
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The district court followed the approach of the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits, which focused on the sentencing guidelines' goal of eliminating
sentencing disparity among comparable offenses.' 35 The court measured the loss by the retail value of the theft, rather than the wholesale
value lost by the victim. 136 The Eleventh Circuit chose to follow the
approach of the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits which focused
"on the particular facts of a case when determining the relevant market
valuation[,]" rather than adopting "a universal retail value in calculating
loss.' 3 The Eleventh Circuit held that for purposes of computing the
amount of the loss under U.S.S.G. section 2B1.1(b)(1), the value of stolen
goods should be measured from the perspective of the victim. 3 '
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's calculation of goods
based on their retail value, where the goods were stolen from a
wholesale dealer and were going to be resold wholesale.'39 The court
noted the concerns about disparate sentencing results voiced in other
circuits, but concluded: "Uniformity is no doubt a goal of the sentencing
guidelines, but so too are the principles of fairness and accuracy....
Utilizing a retail value approach without considering the factual context
of the case increases the possibility that some defendants may be oversentenced for an offense." 4°
2. U.S.S.G. Section 2B4.1 (Bribery) versus U.S.S.G. Section
2F1.1 (Fraud). In United States v. Poirier,'4 1 defendants were
convicted of money-and-property wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343,142 as well as conspiracy, 143 as a result of their participation
in a scheme to defraud Fulton County, Georgia, by corrupting the
process by which the county selected an underwriter for a bond
refunding project.1 " The Government appealed the district court's

underwear. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000)).
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing United States v. Watson, 966 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Russell, 913 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (8th Cir. 1990)).
137. Id. at 1227 (citing United States v. Hardy, 289 F.3d 608, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Carrington, 96 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Williams, 50 F.3d
863, 864 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Warshawsky, 20 F.3d 204, 213 (6th Cir. 1994)).
138. Id. at 1228.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 321 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2003).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
143. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1997).
144. 321 F.3d at 1027-28. Defendants were also charged with honest-services wire
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, but the jury did not reach a verdict on that charge.
Id. at 1028.
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application of U.S.S.G. section 2F1.1(2000), which covered fraud and
deceit, arguing that it should have applied the guideline for commercial
bribery and kickbacks, U.S.S.G. section 2B1.4 (2000)."'1
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of which guideline to apply by
referring to the statutory index, which listed two possible guidelines for
the offense of conviction (wire fraud). 146 The parties agreed that only
one of those guidelines was applicable-section 2F1.1. 47 The commentary to section 2F1.1 specifically provides for the use of other guidelines
in certain circumstances, such as for broad statutes (like mail or wire
fraud statutes), which "'are used primarily as jurisdictional bases for the
In such cases, another guideline
prosecution of other offenses." '
should be used "if 'the indictment or information setting forth the count
of conviction ...establishes an offense more aptly covered by another
guideline.'' 49 The court in Poirier concluded that defendant's actual
conduct ("giving and receiving money in exchange for the misappropriation of documents") "'more closely resembled a fraud achieved through
bribery than a straight fraud.""' 5 Because defendant's conduct was
"more aptly" covered by the commercial bribery guideline (section 2B 1.4)
than the fraud guideline (section 2F1.1), the Eleventh Circuit vacated

145. Id. at 1033. The Eleventh Circuit applied the 2000 version of the guidelines
"because it was in effect at the time of sentencing and the version in effect at the time of
the offense conduct is not more favorable to the defendants." Id. at 1034 n.8 (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B.ll (2000)).
146. Id. at 1033.
147. Id. The parties and the court agreed that U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2C1.7 (2000) (Fraud Involving Deprivation of the Intangible Right to the Honest Services
of Public Officials; Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Governmental Functions)
did not apply. Id.
148. Id. at 1033-34 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1, cmt. 14
(2000)). This provision distinguishes Poirier from other cases like United States v.
Saavedra, 148 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 1998), in which the Statutory Index to the sentencing
guidelines listed only one guideline for the offense conduct, and that guideline contained
no applicable cross-references to other guidelines. Id. at 1315. The Eleventh Circuit
vacated the sentence in Saavedra because "[tihere is no provision in the guidelines for
borrowing base offense levels from other offense guidelines." Id. at 1316.
The court in Poirieralso noted that when the guidelines were amended so as to merge
§ 2F1.1 with § 2B1.1, Application Note 14 was abandoned, but § 2B1.1(c)(3) took its place.
Id. at 1034 n.8. The new guideline specifies that: "'If [certain conditions are not applicable
and) the conduct set forth in the count of conviction establishes an offense specifically
covered by another guideline in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct), [courts should] apply that
other guideline.'" Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1. 1(c)(3) (2002)).
149. Id. at 1034 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1, cmt. n.14

(2000)).
150. Id. at 1034-35 (quoting United States v. Montani, 204 F.3d 761, 769 (7th Cir.
2000)).
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the sentence and remanded it with instructions to resentence the
defendant using section 2B1.4.151
3. U.S.S.G. Section 2B6.1(b)(2): Enhancement for Business of
Receiving and Selling Stolen Goods. In United States v. Saunders, 152 defendant, who was convicted of possessing with intent to sell
motor vehicles with altered vehicle identification numbers, 5 3 appealed
the imposition of a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. section
2B6.1(b)(2)"M for being "in the business of receiving and selling stolen
property." 5 As an initial matter, the Eleventh Circuit determined
that the enhancement focused on "'the defendant's own activities,'" and
thus, the defendant (not just a co-conspirator) "'must
have received and
5
sold stolen property"' to trigger the enhancement. 1
The Eleventh Circuit then confronted the question of first impression
concerning the proper test for applying that enhancement. 7 In the
absence of any clarification of the enhancement or the definition of being
"in the business" from the commentary, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
section 2B1.1(b)(4) contained similar language.5
That language
generated a split among the circuits on the proper test for "'whether a
defendant, who was not the actual thief, was "in the business" or not'"
for purposes of the section 2B1.1(b)(4) enhancement.'5 9 The Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits used the "fence" test, which "'requires proof

151. Id. at 1035-36.
152. 318 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2003).
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 2321(a) (2000).
154. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B6.1(b)(2) (2001).
155. 318 F.3d at 1261. The court in Saunders relied on the sentencing guidelines
manual that became effective on November 1, 2001. Id. at 1262 n.4. Defendant in
Saunders was sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment. Id. at 1262. The guideline
range with the enhancement was eighteen to twenty-four months of imprisonment. The
guideline range without the enhancement was twelve to eighteen months of imprisonment.
Id. at 1262 n.2. Although that same sentence could have been imposed with or without the
enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit agreed to consider the merits of the appeal because the
district court "did not explicitly state that it would have sentenced [the defendant] to
eighteen months regardless of the outcome of the enhancement dispute." Id.
156. Id. at 1263 (quoting United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1119 (11th Cir.
2001)).
157. Id. at 1262-64.
158. Id.
Section 2B1.1(b)(4) provides: "'If the offense involved receiving stolen
property, and the defendant was a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen
property, increase by 2 levels.'" Id. at 1263 n.8 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(4) (2001)).
159. Id. at 1263 (quoting Maung, 267 F.3d at 1118). Courts "generally have agreed
that a thief who sells goods that he himself has stolen is not 'in the business of receiving
and selling stolen property.'" Id. at 1263 n.7 (quoting Maung, 267 F.3d at 1118).
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that the defendant was a person who bought and sold stolen property,
and thereby encouraged others to commit property crimes.'"'6 ° The
First, Third, and Ninth Circuits (and perhaps the Second Circuit),
employed the "totality of the circumstances" test, which uses a "'case by
case approach with emphasis on the "regularity and sophistication of a
defendant's [criminal] operation."'" 16 ' The Sentencing Commission
resolved the split by revising the commentary to section 2B1. 1, effective
November 1, 2001, and adopting the totality of the circumstances
approach.' 62
"Although definitions that appear in one section of the guidelines 'are
not designed for general applicability,' we may also look 'on a case by
case basis' to similar words, phrases or terms used in other sections for
help with interpretation." 1' Given that the Sentencing Commission
did not also revise section 2B6.1(b)(2) or use the same clarifying words
in that section, the court declined to "draw directly" from the revised
commentary to section 2B1.1 in construing section 2B6.1(b)(2).'"
Nonetheless, based on its own analysis, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
totality of the circumstances test, with "'emphasis on the regularity and
'
sophistication of a defendant's operation.'" 65
The court added that the
defendant must personally receive and sell stolen property to qualify for
66
the enhancement.
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the facts of the case to apply the
totality of the circumstances test.6 7 Among the facts that demonstrated that defendant received and sold goods and acted as a "fence" were:

160. Id. at 1263 (quoting Maung, 267 F.3d at 1118 (citations omitted)).
161. Id. (quoting Maung, 267 F.3d at 1118 (citations omitted)).
162. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 at 182
(2001)).
After the amendment, the commentary instructs courts to consider a "non-exhaustive list of factors in determining whether the defendant was in the business of
receiving and selling stolen property":
(A) The regularity and sophistication of the defendant's activities.
(B) The value and size of the inventory of stolen property maintained by the
defendant.
(C) The extent to which the defendant's activities encouraged or facilitated other
crimes.
(D) The defendant's past activities involving stolen property.
Id. at 1263-64 n.8 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. n.4).
163. Id. at 1264 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1, cmt. n.2
(2001)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1265 (quoting United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 703 (1st Cir. 1992)).
166. Id. at 1267.
167. Id. at 1269-73.
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she actually conveyed title to stolen property and participated in
transporting and delivering the vehicles to purchasers; some of the
stolen vehicles were titled in the defendant's name; and she possessed
the vehicles. 1" The evidence of the type of regularity and sophistication that justified imposition of the section 2B6.1(b)(2) enhancement
included: the defendant's conduct spanned almost five years; the loss
was $259,204; and the scheme involved altering paperwork, registration
in a state which avoided a title requirement, and the employment of at
least one other co-conspirator.169 Hence, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the application of the enhancement in Saunders.7 °
C.

Part C: Offenses Involving Public Officials

U.S.S.G. section 2C1.3... (Conflict of Interest; Payment or Receipt
of Unauthorized Compensation) is a guideline not often discussed in
Eleventh Circuit case law. Indeed, it appears that United States v.
72
Hasner1
is the only published Eleventh Circuit decision applying that
guideline. Both defendants in Hasner were convicted of conspiracy to
commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and mail fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.173 Hasner was also convicted of money
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, and Fisher was convicted for
making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The convictions arose out of a scheme in which defendant Hasner (the Chairman
of the Palm Beach County Finance Authority) and defendant Fisher (a
real estate agent/consulting firm owner) would earn secret fees as a
result of a real estate deal involving the finance authority. 7 4 The
district court relied on U.S.S.G. section 2C1.3 for the base offense level
"because the gravamen of the misconduct was the concealment of
Hasner's financial interest." 75 Dissatisfied with the sentencing ranges
because they "trivialized" the misconduct, the district court imposed

168. Id. at 1270-73.
169. Id. at 1273.
170. Id.
171. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL
172. 340 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2003).
173. Id. at 1264.
174. Id. at 1264-67.
175. Id. at 1268.

§ 2C1.3

(2002).
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Both defendants and the Government ap-

pealed. 177
The Government argued that the district court should have applied
section 2C1.7, instead of section 2C1.3, to determine the base offense
level.' v Defendant argued that the district court erred by imposing
the four-level enhancement under Application Note Fifteen of U.S.S.G.
section 2B1.1.179 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Statutory Index
lists two guidelines as applicable to the statute of conviction (18 U.S.C.
§ 1341): section 2B1.1, which provides for a base offense level of six for
various theft crimes, and section 2C1.7, which provides for a base offense
level of ten for fraud involving the deprivation of the intangible right to
the honest services of public officials. 80 Between the two, the Eleventh Circuit stated that section 2C1.7 was "the most applicable to the
offense of conviction."' 8 '
The court then noted that section 2C1.7 has a cross-referencing
provision (subsection(c)(4)), which provides that, "ifthe offense is covered
more specifically under section 2C1.3, the guideline section applicable to
8 2
conflict of interest offenses," then section 2C1.3 should be applied.
Hence, because the offense primarily involved Hasner's failure to disclose
his conflicts of interest, the district court did not clearly err in applying
section 2C1.3.''
The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless vacated the
sentence because the district court relied on section 2B 1.1 to enhance it,
despite the fact that section 2C1.3 has no cross-reference to section
2B1.1.184
D.

Part D: Offenses Involving Drugs

U.S.S.G. section 2D1.1-the guideline applicable to drug manufacturing, importing, exporting, trafficking, and possessing with intent to

176. Id. Defendant Hasner was sentenced to fourteen months of imprisonment.
Defendant Fisher was sentenced to six months of imprisonment. Defendant Fisher's
guideline range with the enhancement was six to twelve months of imprisonment. The
guideline range without the enhancement was zero to six months of imprisonment. Id.
Although that same sentence could have been imposed with or without the enhancement,
the Eleventh Circuit agreed to consider the merits of the appeal because the district court
"did not explicitly say it would have imposed the same sentence without the enhancement."
Id. at 1276 n.6.
177. Id. at 1268.
178. Id. at 1276.
179. Id. at 1275-76.
180. Id. at 1276.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.

1260

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

commit these offenses, as well as attempting or conspiring to do
so-contains several enhancements.' 85 The Eleventh Circuit examined
two such enhancements in 2003-the captain enhancement found in
U.S.S.G. section 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) and the risk of harm 1 8to
a minor
6
enhancement contained in U.S.S.G. section 2D1.1(b)(5)(C).
In United States v. Rendon, s7 the Eleventh Circuit was called upon
to determine what constitutes a "captain" for purposes of section
2D1. 1(b)(2)(B), which provides for a two-level sentence enhancement "[ijf
the defendant unlawfully imported or exported a controlled substance
under circumstances in which... the defendant acted as a pilot, copilot,
captain, navigator, flight officer, or any other operation officer aboard
any craft or vessel carrying a controlled substance." 8
In Rendon
defendant was in charge of a small speedboat, commonly called a "gofast" boat, that was transporting drugs.'89 He argued that the term
"captain" refers to the person listed as a captain on a ship's manifest. 9' The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting that for purposes of the
section 2D1. 1(b)(2)(B) enhancement, other circuits have not adopted such
a rigid definition of the term captain.' 9 ' Instead of giving an exact
definition of "captain" for section 2D1. 1(b)(2)(B) purposes, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that "the facts of this case evidence that Rendon was the
captain in an employment, navigational, and operational sense." 9 2
The facts noted by the Eleventh Circuit in support of this conclusion
included: defendant had "identified himself as the captain to boarding
Coast Guard personnel" and his co-defendants "considered him to be the

185. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2001).
186. The Eleventh Circuit also addressed section 2D1.1 in UnitedStates v. Pressley, 345
F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2003), albeit indirectly. Defendant in Pressley appealed the denial of
his motion for downward departure. Id. at 1208. One of the grounds for the motion was
that the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant substantially overstated the
seriousness of the drug offense. Id. at 1216-18. Because Pressley centered on the
departure guideline, that case is discussed in the section of this Article discussing
departures under Chapter Five, Part K of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, infra
notes 608-42.
187. 354 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003).
188. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(2) (2001).
189. 354 F.3d at 1329.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing United States v. Senn, 129 F.3d 886, 896-97 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that a defendant need only "act as" a captain to warrant sentence enhancement under
section 2D1. 1(b)(2)(B) and that no particular training or licensure is required to justify the
designation); United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332, 346 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting
defendant's assertion that section 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) applies only to offense participants
possessing "special navigational rank or skills").
192. Id.
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captain because he not only navigated the boat directly or indirectly and
was the only crew member who knew its course, but
also he had hired
93
board."
on
operations
their
directed
and
crew
the
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected defendant's argument that the
194
drugs had to actually be imported for the enhancement to apply.
Noting that the general heading of section 2D 1. 1-Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with
Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy-indicates
that the adjustments therein apply to substantive offenses, as well as
attempt and conspiracy offenses, the court concluded that
when the factual predicate in § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) is satisfied, the enhancement is appropriate. In this case, there was sufficient evidence that
Rendon was captain of a vessel carrying a controlled substance and
that he conspired to unlawfully import a controlled substance. It
simply does not matter that his go-fast boat was stopped before the
actual importation was completed. 9
The six-level sentencing enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G. section
196
2DI.I(b)(5)(C) was the court's focus in United States v. Florence.
That enhancement applies "[ilf the offense (i) involved the manufacture
of amphetamine or methamphetamine; and (ii) created a substantial risk
of harm to the life of a minor or an incompetent."' 97 The application
of that enhancement generated a question of first impression in Florence:
"whether U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5)(C), which provides for a six-level
sentencing enhancement when the offense involved the manufacture of
methamphetamine and created a substantial risk of harm to the life of

193. Id.
194. Id. at 1329-30.
195. Id. In affirming the application of the captain enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit
distinguished United States v. Chastain,198 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 966 (2001). Id. at 1330-31 n.7. In Chastain the court reversed a two-level
enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(2)(A), which applies "[i]f the defendant unlawfully
imported or exported a controlled substance under circumstances in which (A) an aircraft
other than a regularly scheduled commercial air carrier was used to import or export the
controlled substance." 198 F.3d at 1344; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL section
2D1.1(b)(2)(A)(2001). Although the general heading of section 2D1.1 included attempt and
conspiracy offenses, the specific language in section 2D1. 1(b)(2)(A)-"air carrier was used
to import or export-was held to mean a completed importation or exportation, not just
an incomplete attempt. Chastain, 198 F.3d at 1353. The court observed that "[t]he factual
predicate in § 2D1.1(b)(2)(A) was not met in Chastainbecause the defendant had not used
the plane to import the controlled substance. In contrast, § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) imposes the
enhancement based on the role of the defendant in the subject importation or exportation."
Rendon, 354 F.3d at 1331 n.7 (emphasis supplied by court).
196. 333 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2003).
197.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

2DI.I(b)(5)(C) (2001).
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a minor, requires the sentencing court to identify a specific minor placed
at risk of harm."19
In the absence of any Eleventh Circuit precedent construing section
2D1.1(b)(5)(C), the court looked to United States v. Gonzalez, 99 which
analyzed a similar enhancement found in U.S.S.G. section 3C1.2 for
"'recklessly creat[ing] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury
to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement
officer.'" 20 0 In Gonzalez the court upheld the imposition of the section
3C1.2 enhancement because
the defendant's actions placed at substantial risk of harm persons
residing on the street or persons who potentially could be present on
Thus, Gonzalez indicates that a district court does not
the street ....
have to identify any specific person placed at risk when it imposes an
enhancement under § 3C1.2.20 1
The court in Florence held that the analysis in Gonzalez was
applicable to section 2D1.1(b)(5)(C). 2°2 However, the court cautioned
that "[alithough the district court is not required to identify a specific
minor, it must still make a finding that the defendant's actions placed
a minor at risk."2 0 ' The Eleventh Circuit then concluded that the
district court's findings-"that minors were staying at the hotel where
Florence was manufacturing methamphetamine and that the fire
occurred at approximately 1:00 A.M., an hour when hotel guests are
normally in their rooms-justified application of the enhancement.2 "'
E. Part G: Offenses205Involving Prostitution, Sexual Exploitation of
Minors, and Obscenity
Defendant in United States v. Dodds206 was convicted of knowingly
possessing material that contained images of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), and knowingly receiving obscene
pictures, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462.207 In sentencing defendant

198. 333 F.3d at 1291.
199. 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996).
200. 333 F.3d at 1292-93 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.2
(2001)).
201. Id. at 1293 (citing Gonzalez, 71 F.3d at 837).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. The guidelines found in Chapter Two, Part G, were also discussed above in
connection with Chapter Two, Part A: Offenses Against the Person.
206. 347 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 2003).
207. Id. at 895.
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pursuant to the section 1492 charge, the district court imposed the fourlevel enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 2G2.2(b)(3), which applies
"'[i]f the offense involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic
' 20 8
conduct or other depictions of violence."'
The Eleventh Circuit observed that U.S.S.G. section 2G3.1, which
applies to convictions under section 1492, provides:
"Ifthe offense involved transporting, distributing, receiving, possessing,
or advertising to receive material involving the sexual exploitation of
a minor, apply § 2G2.2 (Trafficking in Material Involving the Sexual
Exploitation of a Minor; Receiving, Transporting, Shipping, or
Advertising Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor;
Possessing Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with
Intent to Traffic) or § 2G2.4 (Possession of Materials Depicting a Minor
Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct), as appropriate." °9
The Eleventh Circuit went on to note that "[a]lthough the cross-reference
in § 2G3.1 makes clear that either § 2G2.2 or § 2G2.4 should be applied
if the offense is one 'involving the sexual exploitation of a minor,' it does
210
not provide much guidance as to which guideline should be applied."
The court therefore sought guidance from the text and history of the
guidelines, as well as from a Seventh Circuit case, which indicated that
"§ 2G2.2 was meant to punish crimes related to the trafficking of child
pornography, while § 2G2.4 is reserved for punishing those who merely
possess child pornography."21' Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held
that "when a district court applies § 2G3.1(c)(1)'s cross-reference,
sentencing is appropriate under § 2G2.2 only if the government can show
receipt with the intent to traffic."212 Concerning the necessary proof,
the court cautioned that intent to traffic will not usually be established
by simply showing that the defendant possessed a large number of
illegal images.1 Although the Eleventh Circuit resolved the definition-

208. Id. at 900 n.10 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2001)).
The Eleventh Circuit observed that "the general rule is that a defendant is sentenced
under the version of the Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing, barring any ex post
facto concerns." Id. at 900 n.9 (citing United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1403 (11th
Cir. 1997)). Because U.S.S.G. section 2G2.2 and section 2G2.4 were recently amended, "the
applicable guidelines are those that were in effect on the date of sentencing, and not the
amended guidelines. In this discussion, we refer to the guidelines as they stood before they
were amended." Id.
209. Id. at 900-01 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G3.1(c)(1) (2001)).
210. Id. at 901.
211. Id. at 901-02 (citing United States v. Sromalski, 318 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2003); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 372 (2003)).
212. Id. at 902.
213. Id. at 902 n.12.
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al question, it was not prepared to handle the factual questions involved
in applying the correct guideline in the first instance.214 Hence, the
Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the
district court for resentencing.215
United States v. Whitesell 21 6 presented yet another definitional

question of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit. Defendant was
convicted of possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). 2"7 The appropriate sentencing guideline for that
offense is U.S.S.G. section 2G2.4, which instructs the sentencing court
to cross-reference section 2G2.1 "'[i]f the offense involved causing,
transporting, permitting, or offering.., a minor to engage in sexually
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such
conduct.'"2" 8 Section 2G2.4 does not explain what conduct constitutes
"'causing' a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct."2 19 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected the definition of causing developed by the First
Circuit, which "requires that a defendant have physical contact with or
personally photograph the victim." 2 210

Instead, the Eleventh Circuit

adopted the dictionary definition of "causing," that is: "'producing an
effect, result, or consequence' or 'being responsible for an action or
result.'"22 ' Applying that definition, the court held that the facts
supported a finding that defendant "caused" a minor to engage in
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction
of such conduct because the defendant boasted that he coaxed the victim
into photographing herself over a period of time.222 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the imposition of a sentence enhancement under
U.S.S.G. section 2G2.4(c)( 1).223
F

Part K: Offenses Involving Public Safety-Firearms

1. U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(6). Defendant in United States v.
Edmonds224 was convicted of possession of a firearm with an obliterat-

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 902.
Id.
314 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1255 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.4(c)(1) (2000)).
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Chapman, 60 F.3d 894, 900 n.8 (1st Cir. 1995)).
Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 177 (1995)).
Id. at 1256.
Id.
348 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003).
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ed serial number22 5 and was sentenced pursuant to U.S.S.G. section
2K2. 1.226 Defendant appealed the application of U.S.S.G. section
2K2.1(a)(6), which sets the base offense level at fourteen if the
defendant was a "'prohibited person at the time [he] committed the
instant offense.'" 227 A "prohibited person" includes a person22"'who is
an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.'" 1
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the enhancement, holding that "[tihe
Government presented reliable and specific testimony showing [that
defendant's] unlawful use of marijuana was regular, ongoing, and
contemporaneous with the commission of the offense" of conviction.229

The court noted, though, that "the government does not have to prove
the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance at the
time of his arrest. Instead, the government must show the defendant
was an 'unlawful user' of a controlled
substance during the same time
20
period as the firearm possession."

2.

U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(4).

In sentencing defendant for

23 1
firearm-related offenses, the district court in United States v.Ortiz

found that defendant obliterated serial numbers from guns, thereby
invoking the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1
(b)(4).232 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
based on the evidence in the record. In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit
233
also rejected the defendant's claim that Apprendi v. New Jersey
required a jury finding for application of a sentence enhancement under
U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(b)(4). 234 The court reasoned that Apprendi did

225. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2000).
226. 348 F.3d at 951.
227. Id. at 953 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(6) (2002)).
228. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(6), cmt. n.6; 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2000)). Without addressing the issue, the Eleventh Circuit assumed,
for purposes of this appeal, that "unlawful user of" a controlled substance "refers to the
ingestion and consumption of drugs, and not the selling of drugs." Id. The court based this
assumption on the fact that the parties made the same assumption. Id.
229. Id. at 951, 953 (relying on United States v. Bernardine, 73 F.3d 1078, 1082 (11th
Cir. 1996) (holding that to be an "unlawful user of' marijuana a defendant's use must be
"ongoing and contemporaneous with the commission of the offense'").
230. Id. at 953.
231. 318 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 2003).
232. Id. at 1039.
233. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi the Supreme Court held, "[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. at 490.
234. Ortiz, 318 F.3d at 1039.
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not apply because defendant's statutory maximum was not increased by
the guideline enhancement, and, in any event, Eleventh Circuit
precedent has held that "Apprendidoes not apply to calculations under
the Sentencing Guidelines."2 5
In United States v. Adams,3 6 the Eleventh Circuit addressed a
question of first impression concerning the application of U.S.S.G.
section 2K2. 1(b)(4), which provides for a two-level sentence enhancement
for offenses involving stolen firearms. 3 7 The district court applied
that enhancement in sentencing the defendant for possession of a stolen
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j)."' Seven other circuits had
already dealt with the question of whether the application of the
enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm constituted impermissible
double counting when the offense of conviction involved a stolen
firearm. 23 9 The Eleventh Circuit decided to join the majority of its
sister circuits in holding that the application of the two-level enhancedefendant's base
ment under subsection (b)(4) is appropriate unless the
240
offense level is determined under subsection (a)(7).
The Eleventh Circuit explained that the defendant's base offense level
was established by U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(a)(2) because he committed
the offense after sustaining at least two felony convictions. 241' The
court observed that section 2K2.1 provides that if the base offense level
is determined under section 2K2.1(a)(7), the two-level enhancement of
section 2K2.1(b)(4) does not apply because the base offense level under
section 2K2.1(a)(2) "'takes into account that the firearm or ammunition
was stolen.'" 24 2 While the guidelines specifically exempt "defendants
whose base offense level is determined under subsection (a)(7), no such
exception is created for defendants whose base offense level is determined under subsection (a)(2)." 24 Section 2K2.1(a)(2) does not account
for whether a firearm was stolen, but only for a defendant's criminal

235. Id.
236. 329 F.3d 802 (lth Cir. 2003).
237. Id. at 803.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 803-04.
240. Id. (citing United States v. Goff, 314 F.3d 1248, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Raleigh, 278 F.3d 563,566-67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1119 (2002); United
States v. Shepardson, 196 F.3d 306, 311-14 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Hawkins, 181
F.3d 911, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 89, 93 (1st Cir. 1999);
United States v. Luna, 165 F.3d 316, 322-23 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Turnipseed,
159 F.3d 383, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1998)).
241. Id. at 804.
242. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1, cmt. n.12 (2002)).
243. Id.
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history.2"
Consequently, the "plain language" of the sentencing
guidelines undercut the defendant's double-counting argument.
3. Amendment 599. Effective November 1, 2000, Amendment 599
changed the commentary to U.S.S.G. section 2K2.4.245 The three
published Eleventh Circuit decisions addressing that amendment in
2003 have been discussed in connection with U.S.S.G. section 1B1.10,
which provides for the retroactive application of Amendment 599 by way
of a motion to reduce the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The
substantive aspects of those cases, as they relate to the firearms
guidelines found in Chapter Two, Part K, are addressed here.246
Amendment 599 was enacted to "clarify under what circumstances a
weapons enhancement may properly be applied to an underlying offense
when the defendant has also been convicted for the use or possession of
a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which carries a separate and
consecutive punishment for firearm use. " 247 Amendment 599 "expands
the commentary of U.S.S.G. § 2M2.4, which addresses the use of a
firearm in relation to certain crimes." 24 The purpose of Amendment
599 is "'to clarify under what circumstances defendants sentenced for

244. Id.
245. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 599 (2002).
246. Application Note Two to Section 2K2.1, as amended by Amendment 599, now
provides:
If a sentence under this guideline [i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)] is imposed in
conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense [i.e., armed robbery], do not
apply any specific offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or
discharge of an explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the
underlying offense [i.e. robbery]. A sentence under this guideline accountsfor any
explosive or weapon enhancement for the underlying offense of conviction,including
any such enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the defendant
is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Do not apply any weapon
enhancement in the guideline for the underlying offense, for example, if (A) a
co-defendant, as part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, possessed a
firearm different from the one for which the defendant was convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c); or (B) in an ongoing drug trafficking offense, the defendant
possessed a firearm other than the one for which the defendant was convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). However, if a defendant is convicted of two armed bank
robberies, but is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in connection with only one of
the robberies, a weapon enhancement would apply to the bank robbery which was
not the basis for the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.4, cmt. n.2, amend. 599 (2002).
247. Pringle, 350 F.3d at 1179 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to
app. C at 70 (2002)).
248. Armstrong, 347 F.3d at 908 n.4.
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violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). . . may receive weapon
249 enhancements
contained in the guidelines for those other offenses.'"
The Eleventh Circuit held that the retroactive amendment did not
apply factually in Armstrong because defendant's "sentence imposed on
the underlying offenses was not affected by [his] possession of firearms."2 5 In determining whether Amendment 599 applied in Pringle,
the court turned to the language of the amendment.25 ' The court also
noted that Amendment 599 was adopted to avoid "duplicative punishment" and to "prevent 'double counting' for firearms use in any one
criminal event."252 Thus, the amendment would allow for weapons
enhancements for all robberies, except the robbery that served as the
basis for the defendant's § 924(c) conviction. 53 Because the defendant
"received weapons enhancements only in connection with the robberies
for which he did not receive 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions," the Eleventh
Circuit held that the district court properly rejected the Amendment 599
argument.25
Brown was the only case in which the Eleventh Circuit found that
Amendment 599 applied retroactively. 2 5 Defendant pleaded guilty to
using or carrying a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g).256
U.S.S.G. section 2K2.4 applied to sentencing of a section 924(c) offense;
U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1 applied to sentencing of a section 922(g)
offense.257 One of the specific offense characteristics of that guideline
is found in section 2K2.1(b)(5), which adds four offense levels "[i]f the
defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection
with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm
with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or
possessed in connection with another felony offense." 2 ' The Eleventh
Circuit held that under these circumstances, "the retroactively applicable

249. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C at 70). See
also Pringle, 350 F.3d at 1179.
250. Armstrong, 347 F.3d at 908.
251. Pringle,350 F.3d at 1179-80.
252. Id. at 1180 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C at 70
(2002)) (emphasis supplied by court).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1181.
255. Brown, 332 F.3d at 1342.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1343.
258. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2002)).
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Amendment 599 to the Sentencing Guidelines prohibits enhancing the
sentence for the felon-in-possession count with the U.S.S.G. § 2K2. 1(b)(5)
specific offense characteristic for using a firearm in connection to
another felony."259
G. PartL: Offenses Involving Immigration, Naturalization,and
Passports
1. U.S.S.G. Section 2L1.2: Unlawfully Entering or Remaining
in the United States. The 2001 amendment to U.S.S.G. section 2L1.2
generated several cases of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.
Section 2L1.2 governs the sentencing of previously deported aliens who
re-enter the United States illegally and are convicted under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326.260
Section 2L1.2(a) provides for a base offense level of
eight.26 1 Under subsection (b), the sentence is then subject to enhancement if the prior deportation followed a felony conviction of a type
specified in Section 2L1.2(b).262
Before 2001, U.S.S.G. section 2L1.2 required a sixteen-level enhancement if the defendant had previously been convicted "for an aggravated
felony."26 3 Effective November 1, 2001, Amendment 632 changed the
guideline by establishing "more graduated sentencing enhancement of
between 8 levels and 16 levels, depending on the seriousness of the prior
aggravated felony and the dangerousness of the defendant." 2'
The
current version of section 2L1.2(b) provides for the following enhancements:

259.

Id. at 1342. In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit noted that

[pirior to Amendment 599, the relevant portion of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 Application
Note 2 provided that "[w]here a sentence under this section is imposed in
conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, any specific offense
characteristic for the possession, use or discharge of an explosive or firearm...
is not to be applied in respect to the guideline for the underlying offense."
Id. at 1344 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.4, cmt. n.2 (1998)). The
Eleventh Circuit "interpreted the term 'underlying offense' to mean 'crime of violence' or
'drug trafficking offense,' the two explicit bases for a § 924(c) conviction." Id. (quoting
United States v. Flennory, 145 F.3d 1264, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 1998)). However, the court
in Brown stated that "Amendment 599 abrogated Flennory to the extent that the new
application note expanded the definition of underlying offense to include the relevant
conduct punishable under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3." Id. at 1345 n.6.
260. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §'2L1.2 (2002).
261. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(a) (2002).
262. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b) (2002).
263. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2000).
264.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C, amend. 632 (2001).
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(1) Apply the Greatest:
If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in
the United States, after(A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for
which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of
violence; (iii) a firearms offense; (iv) a child pornography offense; (v) a
national security or terrorism offense; (vi) a human trafficking offense;
or (vii) an alien smuggling offense committed for profit, increase by 16
levels;
(B) a conviction for a felony drug trafficking offense for which the
sentence imposed was 13 months or less, increase by 12 levels;
(C) a conviction for an aggravated felony, increase by 8 levels;
(D) a conviction for any other felony, increase by 4 levels; or
(E) three or more convictions for misdemeanors that are crimes of
violence or drug trafficking offenses, increase, by 4 levels. 2s
Amendment 632 was adopted in response to concerns that section 2L1.2
resulted in "disproportionate penalties ... because the breadth of the
definition of 'aggravated felony' ... means that a defendant who
previously was convicted of murder, for example, receives the same
16-level enhancement as a defendant previously convicted of simple
2
assault." 1
Despite the graduated enhancements developed to alleviate the
concerns about different types of prior convictions receiving a blanket
enhancement of sixteen levels, not all concerns were alleviated. For
example, in United States v. Ortega,26 defendant appealed the district
court's denial of his motion for downward departure.2" As an initial
matter, the Eleventh Circuit decided that it could review the district
court's decision because the district court refused to depart downward
based on its belief that it lacked authority to do so.2" 9
The Eleventh Circuit then examined whether the sentencing court
lacked authority to depart downward after applying the sixteen-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 2L1.2 for a prior drug trafficking
conviction. 2"° Defendant argued that the guideline failed to take into
account the differences in the severity of aggravated felonies, such that

265.
266.
267.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2001).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C, amend. 632 (2001).
358 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2003).

268. Id. at 1279.
269. Id.
270.

Id.
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murder and drug trafficking were treated the same.27 ' The Eleventh
Circuit stated:
While the Sentencing Commission determined that it was not fair for
someone convicted of simple assault to receive the same increase as
someone convicted of murder, it also determined that a drug trafficking
crime for which the sentence exceeded thirteen months was serious
enough to warrant a sixteen level enhancement.27 2
The court also pointed out that "the Sentencing Commission specifically
deleted the application note included in the 2000 Sentencing Guidelines
that previously allowed for downward departures based upon seriousness
of the aggravated felony."273 Finding that "the mitigating circumstance" that the defendant sought to apply was adequately considered
in the formulation of Amendment 632, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed
the appeal because the district court correctly ruled that it did not have
the authority to depart downward based on this factor.274
The Eleventh Circuit analyzed and interpreted some of the enhancements contained in the amended version of section 2L1.2(b) in six
published decisions in 2003. Under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), seven
275
Three
categories of offenses invoke the sixteen-level enhancement.
of these categories-drug trafficking offenses for which the sentence
imposed exceeded thirteen months, crimes of violence, and alien
smuggling offenses committed for profit-were addressed in published
Eleventh Circuit cases in 2003.
A prior "drug trafficking offense" will justify a sixteen-level increase
under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), if the offense resulted in a sentence of
more than thirteen months.27 If, however, it resulted in a sentence
27 7
of thirteen months or less, it requires a twelve-level enhancement.
a
"drug
define
For purposes of these enhancements, the guidelines
trafficking offense" as "an offense under federal, state, or local law that
prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of
a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of

271. Id.
272. Id. at 1280 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2001)).
273. Id. at 1280 n.4 (comparing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2
background (2000), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 background
(2001)).
274. Id. at 1280 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2001)).
275. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2001).
276. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) (2001).
277. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) (2001).
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a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. 78
The sixteen-level enhancement for a prior drug trafficking offense was
discussed in two cases-United States v. Madera-Madera279 and United

States v. Orihuela.280 The twelve-level enhancement was at issue in
United States v. Anderson.28 1

In Madera-Madera the prior drug

offense was a Georgia state conviction for possession of more than
twenty-eight grams of methamphetamine.28 2 Even though the threetiered Georgia statute called the offense "possession," the Eleventh
Circuit deemed it a "drug trafficking offense" because the Sentencing
Commission "defined drug trafficking by the type of conduct prohibited
by the state statute[,]" rather than by its elements. 283 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit phrased the question as "whether the federal definition
of drug trafficking in the Guidelines is satisfied by Georgia's drug
trafficking offense which punishes possession of a significant, designated
quantity of drugs." 2 4 The court concluded that the Georgia statute
does satisfy the drug trafficking definition "because Georgia's three-tiered scheme treats an elevated amount of drugs as equivalent to an intent
to distribute and thereby traffic."285 The Eleventh Circuit reflected
that this conclusion was consistent with the purpose of the 2001 amendments, which was "to ensure that those illegal alien defendants
with
2
more severe prior offenses received more severe sentences." 11
Likewise, in Orihuela,the court ruled, as a matter of first impression,
that the federal offense of using a telephone to facilitate a drug offense,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), 28 7 can support the sixteen-level
enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) if the underlying drug crime
that was facilitated was a felony and the defendant received a sentence
Without any reported decisions on
of at least thirteen months. 8

278. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2, cmt. n.l(B)(iii) (2001).
279. 333 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).
280. 320 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2003).
281. 328 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003).
282. Madera-Madera,333 F.3d at 1230.
283. Id. at 1233.
284. Id.
285.

Id.

286. Id. at 1234.
287. Section 843(b) provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to use any communication facility in committing or in causing
or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision
of this subchapter." See 21 U.S.C. § 843 (2000). The maximum penalty for this offense is
four years imprisonment and a fine of not more than $30,000. Orihuela, 320 F.3d at 1303
n.1 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 843).
288. 320 F.3d at 1303.
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point, the Eleventh Circuit reached its conclusion in Orihuela by
referencing decisions interpreting the substantially similar guideline
definition of "controlled substance offense" under the career offender
guideline, U.S.S.G. section 4B1.1, which has been uniformly held to
include telephone counts.2" 9 After noting that the Sentencing Commission amended the commentary to the career offender guideline to codify
the decisions ruling that a telephone facilitation offense is a controlled
substance offense, 2" the court found it significant that the definition
of a "drug trafficking offense" in U.S.S.G. section 2L.1.2(b)(1) had not
been similarly amended.29 ' Nonetheless, this fact did not change the
Eleventh Circuit's holding. 2
In Anderson the court was called upon to determine whether a nolo
contendere plea with adjudication withheld qualified as "'a conviction for
a felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed was 13
months or less'" for purposes of the twelve-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. section 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).29 3 The court observed that the term
"conviction" is subject to various definitions depending on the context.294 For example, "a plea of nolo contendere with adjudication
withheld is not a conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because
a nolo contendere plea is not a conviction under Florida law" and section
922 required that the term "conviction" be defined based upon state
2 95

law.

Because section 2L1.2 does not require reference to state law for the
definition of "conviction," federal law controls. 2" Although the sentencing commission did not define "conviction" for purposes of section
2L1.2, Congress did define that term, as it is used in 8 U.S.C. § 1326, to
mean:
[A] formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if
adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where-

289. Id. at 1304 (citing United States v. Vea- Gonzales, 999 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Walton, 56 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mueller,
112 F.3d 277, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Williams, 176 F.3d 714, 718 (3d Cir.
1999)). The definition of "controlled substance offense" for career offender purposes is
contained in U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (2001). See id.
290. Id. at 1304 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 568).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1305.
293.

328 F.3d at 1328 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

2L1.2(b)(1)(B)

(2001)).
294. Id. at 1327-28.
295. Id. at 1327 (citing United States v. Willis, 106 F.3d 966, 967-69 (11th Cir. 1997)).
296. Id. at 1328 (citing United States v. Mejias, 47 F.3d 401, 403-04 (11th Cir. 1995)).
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(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to
warrant a finding of guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.297
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the definition of conviction set forth in
section 1101(a)(48)(A), governs section 2L1.2(b) 29" Hence, the court
ruled that defendant's nolo contendere plea with adjudication withheld
qualified for the twelve-level enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(B),
"as long as some punishment, penalty, or restraint on liberty is
imposed."2M Defendant's sentence of time served, which was twentytwo days of imprisonment, sufficed. 3"
The sixteen-level enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for prior
crimes of violence was the subject of United States v. Hernandez3 2
"
For purposes of
Gonzalez3 01 and United States v. Fuentes-Rivera.
a "crime of
define
guidelines
U.S.S.G. section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), the
violence" as follows:
"Crime of Violence'(I) means an offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another; and
(II) includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,
forcible sex offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor), robbery, arson,
extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwellextortion,
3
ing.

30

The use of the conjunctive "and" to divide subsections I and II was at
issue in Hernandez-Gonzalez and Fuentes-Rivera.3' These two cases
serve as a reminder of the importance of preserving sentencing issues in
the district court. Issues not objected to in the district court will only be
reviewed for plain error on appeal. Under that standard, even if the
guideline is misapplied, the Eleventh Circuit could still affirm the
erroneous sentence. Hernandez-Gonzalez illustrates this problem.

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000) (emphasis added by court)).
Id. (citing United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517, 521-22 (10th Cir. 2002)).
Id.
Id.
318 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2003).
323 F.3d 869 (11th Cir. 2003).

303.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

2L1.2, cmt. n.l(B)(ii) (2001).

304. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d at 1302; Fuentes.Rivera, 323 F.3d at 872.
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In Hernandez-Gonzalez defendant's prior conviction was for obstruction of an officer."0 5 Defendant claimed that because the two subsections defining crime of violence are separated by "and" instead of "or,"
both subsections must be established to apply the sixteen-level enhancement.0 6 Because his offense only satisfied the first subsection, but
was not listed in the second subsection, it could only be classified as an
aggravated felony, which warranted an eight-level enhancement under
section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), as opposed to a crime of violence, which would
warrant the sixteen-level enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)
(A)(ii).3 °7 Without deciding whether defendant's argument had merit,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the limitations of the plain error
doctrine precluded relief.308 The court explained that "because the
guideline is ambiguous and lacks judicial interpretation on this point,
even if it was erroneously applied, the error could not have been
plain."30 9 Thus, the sixteen-level enhancement was affirmed.3 10
Defendant in Fuentes-Rivera made a similar argument, but he also
objected at sentencing. 31' His prior conviction was for first degree
burglary.3 12 Although that offense did not include an element indicating the use of force, as required by the first subsection of the crime of
violence definition in section 2L1.2, burglary was one of the enumerated
offenses in the second subsection. 313 Because this was an issue of first
impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the court looked to other circuits that
had addressed the issue.314 Consistent with those circuits, the Elev-

305. 318 F.3d at 1300.
306. Id. at 1301.
307. Id. at 1301-02.
308. Id. at 1302. To satisfy the plain error standard, "'a party must demonstrate: (i)
that there was error in the lower court's action, (ii) that such error was plain, clear, or
obvious, and (iii) that the error affected substantial rights, i.e. that it was prejudicial and
not "harmless."'" Id. at 1301 (quoting United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1578 (11th Cir.
1995)).
309. Id. at 1302.
310. Id.
311. 323 F.3d at 870-71.
312. Id. at 870 n.1 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 2003) ("[elvery person who
enters any ... building... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is
guilty of burglary")).
313. Id. at 871 (referring to U.S SENTENCING GuIDELINES MANuAL § 2L1.2, cmt.
n.l(B)(ii)(I)-(II) (2001)).
314. Id. at 871-72 (citing United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 300 F.3d 974, 979 (8th
Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that the offense of "sexual abuse of a minor" was not a crime
of violence because it did not contain the physical-force element), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1138 (2003); United States v. Rayo-Valdez, 302 F.3d 314,318-20(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1095 (2002) (holding that all the offenses listed in Application Note 1(B)(ii)(II) were
crimes of violence, regardless of their elements under various state laws).
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enth Circuit held that the use of the word "and" between the two
subsections of the definition of crime of violence did not mean that both
subsections must apply to qualify the offense as a crime of violence.3 15
The court explained that because subpart (I) of the commentary
definition specifically referenced "burglary of a dwelling... despite its
lack of an element regarding physical force, and because an alternative
reading would render the subpart (II) mere surplusage, the district court
did not err in determining that burglary of a dwelling was a 'crime of
violence' for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)."316
The enhancement in United States v. Krawczak31 7 was based on the
defendant's 1994 conviction for alien smuggling in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(B).318 That subsection of the statute did not penalize alien
smuggling for profit. Rather, a different subsection of the 1993 statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), prohibited smuggling an alien to the United
States for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.
Defendant in Krawczak was not charged with and did not plead guilty
to violating that subsection. However, the district court relied on the
presentence report for the prior conviction to rule that the offense was
committed for profit, thereby requiring the sixteen-level enhancement.31 9
In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit noted the general rule that "a
sentencing court applying a statutory enhancement is .

.

. required to

consider only the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the

prior offense."3 20 The very narrow exception to this rule applies when
321

"the judgment of conviction and the statute are ambiguous."
Concluding that the statute and conviction in this case were not
ambiguous, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district court should not
have reviewed the underlying facts of the conviction.322 Hence, the
sixteen-level enhancement for alien smuggling for profit was reversed
and the case was remanded with instructions that only the eight-level
enhancement
for an aggravated felony (alien smuggling without profit)
323
could apply.

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 872.
Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2, cmt. l(B)(ii) (2001)).
331 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304-05.
Id. at 1306 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990)).
Id. (citing United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Id. at 1307.
Id. (citing U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (2001)).
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2. U.S.S.G. Section 2L2.1. The only other alien-related guideline
examined by the Eleventh Circuit in 2003 was U.S.S.G. section 2L2.1,
which was applied in sentencing the defendant in United States v.
Singh324 for possessing with intent to use or transfer five or more false
identification documents.3 25 Pursuant to section 2L2.1(b)(2), "[i]f the
offense involved six or more documents or passports," graduated levels
of enhancements apply depending on the number of documents or
passports involved.32 s In the absence of a definition of "documents" in
section 2L2.1 and its application notes, the court in Singh was called
upon to determine if the domestic drivers' licenses, military identification
cards, and United States government identification cards that were
involved in the offense of conviction could be counted as documents for
purposes of the guideline enhancement. 2 7
The Eleventh Circuit rejected defendant's position that the title of the
guideline-Trafficking in a Document Relating to Naturalization,
Citizenship, or Legal Resident Status, or a United States Passport-limits the types of documents upon which the enhancement can be
based.
Instead, the court sided with the Government, which argued
that the language of section 2L2. 1(b)(2)-"[i]f the offense involved six or
more documents or passports"-referred to the offense of conviction,
thereby making any documents involved in that offense relevant for
enhancement purposes. 2 9
Defendant in Singh pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(3)
and (a)(4), which criminalize various fraudulent activities relating to
"identification documents."3

0

The definition of "identification docu-

ment" set forth in the statute of conviction is broad enough to encompass
the drivers' licenses and identification documents counted by the district
court to reach the total of 100 or more for the nine-level enhancement.3 3 ' Hence, the court affirmed the enhancement.3 2
324. 335 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2003).
325. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000).
326. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L2.1(b)(2) (2002).
327. 335 F.3d at 1323.
328. Id. at 1324. "Because the language of § 2L2. 1(b)(2) clearly resolves this issue, we
reject Singh's reliance upon the title of § 2L2.1 to support his restrictive definition of
'documents.' As we have noted before, 'The Court will not look to the title of a guideline
to explain what is quite clear in its text.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d
1338, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999)).
329. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L2.1(b)(2) (2002)).
330. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(3), (a)(4) (2000)).
331. An identification document is defined in the offense of conviction as:
a document made or issued by or under the authority of the United States
Government, a State, political subdivision of a State, a foreign government,
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Part S: Money Laundering and Monetary Thansaction Reporting

In 2002, U.S.S.G. section 2S1.1 (money laundering) played an
important part in Eleventh Circuit sentencing guidelines decisions,
especially in light of Amendment 635, which became effective in
2001.333 In 2003, however, only one published decision discussed the
334
money laundering guideline-- United States v. Martin.
Although
defendant in Martin was sentenced after the effective date of the money
laundering guideline amendment, his offense was committed before that
date. Therefore, the 1998 version, not the current version, of the
guideline was applied.33 5 Because of the substantial difference between the two versions, the court noted the limited impact of its
decision.336
The question in Martin was whether the district court properly
calculated the "value of the funds" under U.S.S.G. section 2S1.1 in
calculating the defendant's offense level at sentencing.3 7 Pursuant to
section 2S1.1(b) of the 1998 guidelines, the base offense level is
increased on a graduated scale based on the amount of money laundered.338 "The commentary to section 2S1.1 states, 'The amount of
money involved is included as a factor because it is an indicator of the
magnitude of the criminal enterprise,
and the extent to which the
3 39
defendant aided the enterprise.'"
Defendant in Martin deposited $380,050.08 in stolen funds in the bank
and then wrote checks on that amount to obtain cash, cashiers' checks,
and certificates of deposit.' ° In all, he engaged in ninety-seven
separate monetary transactions flowing from this amount. The ninety-

political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental or an
international quasi-governmental organization which, when completed with
information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly
accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals.
18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(2) (2000).
332. 335 F.3d at 1325.
333. See, e.g., United States v. Descent, 292 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Venske, 296 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.
2002); United States v. Schlaen, 300 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2002). See also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 634 (2001).
334. 320 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2003).
335. Id. at 1225 n.2.
336. Id. at 1227 n.3.
337. Id. at 1225.
338. Id. at 1225-26.
339. Id. at 1226 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1, cmt.
background (1998)).
340. Id. at 1225.
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seven money laundering
transactions for which Martin was convicted
341
totaled $1,055,068.21.
The five-level increase set forth in section 2S1.1(b)(2)(F) was applied
in Martin because the district court determined that the "value of the
funds" was more than $1 million but less than $2 million. The district
court reached this amount by adding together the ninety-seven monetary
transactions for which the defendant was convicted.34 2 Defendant
challenged this calculation, arguing that the value of the funds means
"the amount of money originally injected or infused into the money
laundering scheme[,]" which, in this case, was the $380,050.08 in stolen
checks from which all the transactions flowed. 43
The Eleventh Circuit rejected defendant's argument, stating: "Each
unlawful monetary transaction harms society by impeding law enforcement's efforts to track ill-gotten gains."3 " By adding together each
individual transaction, "the district court's calculation accurately
reflected the scope of the criminal enterprise."34 5 In concluding that
the district court properly interpreted "the value of the funds" under
section 2S1.1 of the 1998 Sentencing Guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit
observed that in light of the substantial changes effectuated by the 2001
guideline amendment, its holding did not apply to the "value of the
laundered funds" in section 2S1.1(a)(2) of the 2001 guidelines.346 The
court explained:
[A]lithough the district court properly aggregated the funds from
layered transactions in determining the "value of the funds" under
§ 2S1.l(b)(2) of the 1998 Guidelines, it might be improper for a district
court to do so when determining the "value of the laundered funds"
under § 2S1.1(a)(2) of the 2001 Guidelines because § 2S1.1(b)(3) of the
2001 Guidelines provides for a two level increase for "sophisticated
laundering. " "
I.

PART T: OFFENSES INVOLVING TAXATION

The Eleventh Circuit addressed tax loss calculations under U.S.S.G.
section 2T1.1 and section 2T12.1 in two cases in 2003. In United States
v. Patti,3 8 defendant pleaded guilty to filing a false income tax

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1225-26.
Id. at 1227 (citing United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 1348, 1369 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Id.
Id. at 1227 n.3.
Id.
337 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003).
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return,34 9 and conspiring to defraud the United States.3 5 0
The
Eleventh Circuit addressed an issue of first impression concerning
whether the tax loss can be calculated by aggregating the corporate and
personal tax losses.3 5' Noting a split in the circuits,352 the Eleventh
Circuit found support for its position upholding the aggregation of
personal and corporate tax losses by quoting the commentary to U.S.S.G.
section 2T1.1, which provided that "[i]f the offense involves both
individual and corporate tax returns, the tax loss is the aggregate tax
3 53
loss from the offenses taken together."
As further support for its position, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
guidelines were amended in 2001, at which time the Commission
adopted the view taken by the Eleventh Circuit in Patti.3" Under the
amended commentary to U.S.S.G. section 2T1.1, "'[i]f the offense
involved both individual and corporate tax returns, the tax loss is the
aggregate tax loss from the individual tax offense and the corporate tax
offense added together.'"3 55 Based on the plain language of the
commentary, the Eleventh Circuit found that the amendment was
clarifying, rather than substantive. 56
Specifically, the amended
"commentary provides that it 'clarifies the prior rule in Application Note
7 of §2T1. 1 that if the offense involves both individual and corporate tax
returns, the tax loss is the aggregate tax loss from the offenses taken
35 7
together.'"
In United States v. Delgado,35" defendants were convicted and
sentenced for engaging in an "alcohol diversion" scheme for the purpose
of evading federal liquor taxes.35 9 Defendant appealed the district
court's loss calculation of $681,519.15, claiming that there was no loss

349. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2000).
350. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
351. 337 F.3d at 1323.
352. Id. The court in Patti observed that the Second and Seventh Circuits refused to
aggregate corporate and personal tax losses, finding that such aggregation would overstate
the tax revenue lost. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 672 (2d Cir.
1998); United States v. Harvey, 996 F.2d 919, 920-22 (7th Cir. 1993)). The Sixth Circuit,
on the other hand, held that such aggregation was appropriate to reflect the seriousness
of the harm the defendant caused. Id. (citing United States v. Cseplo, 42 F.3d 360, 364-65
(6th Cir. 1994)).

353. Id. (quoting U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2T1.1, cmt. n.7 (2001)).

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2T1.1, cmt. n.7 (2001)).

354. Id. at 1324.

355. Id. (quoting U.S.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id.
Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C at 191 (2001)).
321 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1338.
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because the government could have collected on the bond for the liquor
shipments but chose not to do so."O
Under United States Sentencing Guidelines section 2T2. 1(a) "the 'tax
loss' is the amount of taxes that the taxpayer failed to pay or attempted
not to pay." 6' The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court
correctly calculated that amount, and the fact that the government could
have collected the unpaid taxes by enforcing its rights under a bond
38 2
posted for the liquor shipments, but chose not to, was irrelevant.
The court explained that "'the United States is not bound by state
statutes of limitation or subject to the defense of laches in enforcing its
rights"' or in protecting the public interest."s
J.

PART X: CONSPIRACY

In United States v. Anderson,36 defendant was convicted of bidrigging United States government contracts for the construction of water
purification plants in Egypt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1 (section one of
the Sherman Antitrust Act), and conspiracy to defraud the United
States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.365 The parties agreed that
U.S.S.G. section 2X1.1 was the proper starting point for analyzing the
conspiracy count.366 For the base offense level, section 2X1.1(a) refers
to the "base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense."3 67 The dispute in Anderson arose as to what guideline was
appropriate for the substantive offense-U.S.S.G. section 2F1.1 (fraud)
or U.S.S.G. section 2R1.1 (bid-rigging). 368 The district3 69court opted for
the fraud guideline and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned: "The conviction in this case assumes
Anderson committed fraud. Bid-rigging was merely a means to an
end."37 ° The court also observed that section 2R1.1 was not listed in
the commentary to section 2X1.1 as a guideline that specifically covers

360. Id. at 1348.
361. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T2.1(a) (2002)).
362. Id. at 1348-49.
363. Id. (quoting United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940); United States
v. Fernon, 640 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981)).
364. 326 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2003).
365. Id. at 1322.
366. Id. at 1331.
367. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X1.1(a) (1995).
368. 326 F.3d at 1331. The court noted that prior to sentencing, in 2001, section 2F1.1
was deleted and consolidated into section 2B 1.1. However, the parties consented to the use
of the 1995 guideline manual. Id. at 1331-32 n.3.
369. Id. at 1331-32.
370. Id. at 1332.
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conspiracies; hence, it was not mandatorily applicable. 3 71 Accordingly,
because the object of the offense was fraud, section 2F1. 1 was the proper
guideline.372 Nonetheless, the court added:
At the very least, we can conclude § 2F1.1 and § 2R1.1 equally apply
to the conduct in this case. In such an event, we apply the provision
that results in the greater offense level. USSG § 1B1.1 App. Note 5.
37 3
In this case, § 2F1.1 results in a greater offense level than § 2R1.1.
Defendants in United States v. Puche37 4 were convicted of conspiracy
to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) & (h). 75
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly relied on the
base offense level for "promotion" money laundering under U.S.S.G.
section 2S1.1(a)(1) where the jury found that defendants conspired to
commit "promotion" and "concealment" money laundering, and the
promotion money laundering yielded the higher base offense level. 7 6
The Eleventh Circuit also held that the district court was correct in
applying the specific offense characteristics that were established by the
verdict, such as the amount of money involved during the time period
37
the jury found that the defendants were part of the conspiracy.
However, the court reversed the defendants' sentence when the district
court failed to apply the three-level reduction for uncompleted conspiracy
offenses under U.S.S.G. section 2X1.1(b)(2) "because they had not
completed or were not close to completing all the acts they believed
necessary for the completion of the money laundering scheme, especially
with regard to the six million dollars in future transactions. 7 8
Although defendants intended to complete the transactions as soon as
possible, defendants still needed to take "crucial steps" such as
paperwork and contacting agents. 79 Thus, the failure to apply section
2X1.1's three-level reduction was "clear error," and the case was
remanded "for the limited purpose of applying the three-level reduction
of U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2) and then resentencing within the resulting
U.S.S.G. range.

371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
(2002)).
377.
378.
379.
380.

Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X1.1, cmt. 1 (1995)).
Id.
Id. at 1332 n.4.
350 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1154-55 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2S1.1(a)(1)-(2)
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1155 (citing United States v. Khawaja, 118 F.3d 1454 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Id.
Id. at 1157.
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CHAPTER THREE: ADJUSTMENTS

381
PartB: Role in the Offense

Of the four role-related guidelines in Chapter Three, Part B, the two
most commonly found in Eleventh Circuit case law provide for upward
or downward adjustments depending on the defendant's aggravating or
mitigating role in the offense- U.S.S.G. sections 3B1.1 and 3B1.2,
respectively. 82 Out of the past five years, the only year that generated
more Eleventh Circuit decisions on these two guidelines than 2003 was
1999-the year the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, rendered United
States v.Rodriguez De Varon.8 s
1. U.S.S.G. Section 3B.: Aggravating Role. U.S.S.G. section
3B1.1 provides for three tiers of aggravating role adjustments with
graduated increases. 384 The most aggravating role, warranting a fourlevel increase, applies "[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of
a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive." 385 Next, a three-level increase applies "[i]f the
defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader)
and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive." 6 Finally, the least of the aggravating role
enhancements, two levels, applies "[i]f the defendant was an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity" other than that
described in connection with the three and four-level increases. 7
Because the defendant's role in the offense is a question of fact, the
cases dealing with role adjustments are fairly fact specific. However,
some general rules and factors must be considered in making the factual
determinations. For example, in Rendon,3 s the court noted that the
following factors should be considered in determining whether the
defendant occupied an aggravating role in the offense:

381. The victim-related adjustments set forth in Part A of Chapter Three are the only
category of Chapter Three adjustments about which the Eleventh Circuit published no
decisions in 2003.
382. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.1, 3B1.2, 3B1.3, and 3B1.4
(2002).
383. 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
384. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (2002).
385. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3Bl.l(a) (2002).
386. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(b) (2002).
387. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(c) (2002).
388. Rendon is discussed in the section analyzing the captain enhancement for
purposes of U.S.S.G. section 2D1.I(b)(2)(B), at supra notes 185-204.
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"(1) exercise of decision-making authority, (2) nature of participation
in the commission of the offense, (3) recruitment of accomplices, (4)
claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, (5) degree of
participation in planning or organizing the offense, (6) nature and
scope of the illegal activity,
and (7) degree of control and authority
38 9
exercised over others.
For one defendant to be an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor,
there must be other participants for him to organize, lead, manage, or
supervise. 90 The other participants in the offense must be "'criminally
responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been
convicted.'" 3 9 ' Further, the court has recognized that
"[t]he defendant does not have to be the sole leader or kingpin of the
conspiracy in order to be considered an organizer or leader within the
meaning of the Guidelines," and that "[blecause the district court must
interpret the factors stated in the commentary, and must exercise its
best judgment as to the application of the facts to 39
these
standards, its
2
decision is entitled to one of deference on appeal."
Applying these general rules to the facts in Rendon, the court
concluded that the district court did not clearly err in attributing a fourlevel organizer or leader role to defendant Rendon inasmuch as there
were "at least eight people involved with the conspiracy over whom
Rendon exercised leader and organizational control."393 The court also
ruled that the section 3B1. 1(a) role enhancement did not result in double
counting when the defendant was also enhanced for being a captain
under section 2D1.L(b)(2)."
"'Absent an instruction to the contrary,
the adjustments from different guideline sections are applied cumulatively (added together).'" '9 5 Neither section 3B1.1 nor section 2D1.1
(b)(2) gives any indication that the two sections cannot be applied
cumulatively.3 9 Rather, "the two enhancements embody 'conceptually
separate notions relating to sentencing' because they are designed for

389. Rendon, 354 F.3d at 1331-32 (quoting United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154,
1169 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1096 (2002).
390. Id. at 1332.
391. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1, cmt. n.1 (2002)).
392. Id. (quoting Vallejo, 297 F.3d at 1169 (internal citation omitted) (alteration in
original)).
393. Id. at 1332-33.
394. Id. at 1333-34.
395. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1, cmt. n.4 (2002);
United States v. Naves, 252 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 2001)).
396. Id. at 1334.
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two different purposes.""' The section 3B1. 1 role enhancement applies
based on the defendant's "relative culpability within a criminal
organization."3 98 The section 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) captain enhancement, on
the other hand, "addresses those who facilitate a drug smuggling
operation by filling a critical position without which the operation likely
would fail."399 Hence, the two enhancements are not mutually exclusive.4 o
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the defendants in three cases-Yeager,4 ' Poirier,4 2 and United States v. Perry 4° 3 -warranted
the two-level role enhancement. In Perry, as in Rendon, the court was
asked to decide whether the defendant could occupy two different
roles. 4 4 First, the court in Perry affirmed the imposition of the twolevel role enhancement based on the facts that defendant "(1) actively
recruited two individuals to transport drugs, (2) arranged one of those
recruited individuals to transport cocaine, (3) directly paid at least one
of those individuals for transporting cocaine, and (4) was, in turn, paid
for his recruitment and supervision of individuals in that drug conspira-

cy. "405

Notwithstanding the ruling on the leadership role enhancement,
defendant in Perry challenged the denial of the minor role reduction.4 °6
Although there was no Eleventh Circuit precedent on the issue, the court
noted support in other circuits for the proposition that the aggravating
and mitigating role adjustments are not mutually exclusive. 7

397. Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 276 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2001)
(internal citation omitted)).
398. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1, cmt. background
(2002)).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. 331 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). Yeager is discussed earlier in this Article in
connection with fraud loss calculations under U.S.S.G. section 2F1.1 (2000), at supra notes
108-40.
402. 321 F.3d 1024 (l1th Cir. 2003). Poirieris discussed further under Chapter Two,
Part B, regarding the interaction of U.S.S.G. section 2B4.1 (Bribery) and U.S.S.G. section
2F1.1 (Fraud), at supra notes 141-51; Chapter Three, Part B, regarding the abuse of
position of trust adjustment, at infra notes 433-47; and Chapter Three, Part C, regarding
obstruction of justice, at infra notes 448-97.
403. 340 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
404. Id. at 1217.
405. Id. at 1217-18.
406. Id. at 1218.
407. Id. (citing United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Nothing in the
Guidelines or in the enabling legislation, the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 to
3585 (1988), compels [the] conclusion" that aggravating and mitigating roles cannot
coexist); United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d 910, 922 (7th Cir. 2000), rev'd in part on other
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Observing that the government "inexplicably" failed to comment on the
cases from other circuits that were cited in the defendant's briefs, the
Eleventh Circuit declined to reach the issue "without reasoned argument
from the government."1 °8 Thus, the court remanded the case to the
district court for consideration of the minor role arguments.4 '
In upholding the two-level enhancement in Yeager, the court rejected
defendant's argument that in a two-member conspiracy, both members
cannot be leaders.410
When a conspiracy involves only two participants, each participant can
be a "organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor" in the criminal conduct
when each participant takes primary responsibility for a distinct
component of the plan and exercises control or influence over the other
participant with respect to that distinct component of the plan.411
In Poirier the district court declined to apply the two-level role
enhancement even though the evidence at trial clearly established that
defendant supervised and managed at least one other participant in the
criminal activity.412 "The district court did not find to the contrary,
but instead simply and inexplicably failed to apply the enhancement.
That was clear error."41 3 Therefore, the sentence was reversed and the
case remanded for resentencing with instructions to apply the section
3B1.1(c) enhancement.414
2. U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.2: Mitigating Role. Pursuant to U.S.S.G.
section 3B1.2, a "minimal participant in any criminal activity" may
receive a four-level guideline decrease,41 5 while a "minor participant in
any criminal activity" may receive a two-level guideline decrease.41 6
Further, participants with roles that are between minor and minimal
may warrant a three-level decrease. 417 As with almost every minor
role case since 1999, the Eleventh Circuit cited De Varon in support of

grounds, 531 U.S. 953 (2000) ("Section 3B1.2 does not say that a manager or supervisor
cannot be a minor participant; all that is required is that he be less culpable than most of
the other participants")).
408. Id. at 1218-19.
409. Id. at 1219.
410. 331 F.3d at 1227.
411. Id.
412. 321 F.3d at 1036.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(a) (2002).
416. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(b) (2002).
417. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (2002).
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its rulings in United States v. Freixas,415 and Hunter.419 In De Varon
the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, announced that the two legal
factors that guide the district court in its fact-finding inquiry under
U.S.S.G. section 3B1.2 are: "[first and foremost, the district court must
measure the defendant's role against her relevant conduct, that is, the
conduct for which she has been held accountable under U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3," and second, "whe[n] the record evidence is sufficient, the
district court may also measure the defendant's conduct against that of
other 42participants
in the criminal scheme attributed to the defen0
dant.

Based on these factors, in Freixas, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's refusal to grant a minor role adjustment.4 2 ' The court
pointed out that Freixas's role in the conspiracy, which included hooking
up a computer and downloading forty-five stolen credit card numbers,
was "no less significant" than the role of other co-conspirators.422 In
Hunter, on the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district
court's denial of minor role sentence reductions.4 2 As noted in the
relevant conduct portion of this Article (U.S.S.G. section 1B1.3), the
court in Hunterremanded the case for resentencing because the district
court did not make particularized findings regarding the scope of the
defendants' agreements as required by U.S.S.G. section 1B1.3(a)(1)
(B). 424 Because defendants' roles must be measured against their
relevant conduct, and because the case was remanded for redetermination of defendants' relevant conduct, the Eleventh Circuit stated that 425
it
was "premature for [it] to rule on [the minor role] issue today."
Hence, the district
court was directed to revisit the minor role ruling in
4 26
light of De Varon.

United States v. Jeter42 concerned a different aspect of a minor role.
The court in Jeter held that a minor role sentence adjustment is not
available to a defendant sentenced as a "career offender" under U.S.S.G.

418. 332 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003).
419. 323 F.3d at 1323. Hunter is also discussed in the sections of this Article relating
to relevant conduct (U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3), at supra notes 3-29
and criminal history calculations (U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2), at infra
notes 528-52.
420. 175 F.3d at 944-45.
421. 332 F.3d at 1321.
422. Id.
423. 323 F.3d at 1323.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. 329 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2003).
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section 4BL.1.428 The court noted that section 4B1.1 specifically
authorizes only an adjustment to the offense level for acceptance of
responsibility.429 The court therefore rejected defendant's argument
40
that the rule of lenity applied to authorize a minor role adjustment. 1
"Because § 4B1.1, by its express terms, only authorizes an adjustment
based on acceptance of responsibility, and does not mention the minor
role adjustment, and since 'the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of
others,' . . . the guideline is not ambiguous and the rule of lenity does

not apply."43' In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit observed that its
decision was consistent with the First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits, "all of which have held that mitigating role adjustments
do not apply in the career offender scenario." 32
3. U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.3: Abuse of a Position of Trust.
U.S.S.G. section 3B1.3 allows for a two-level increase "[i]f the
defendant abused a position of public or private trust,... in a manner
that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense."433 This enhancement was addressed in two Eleventh Circuit
cases in 2003.
In United States v. Hall,3 4 defendant, a pastor, was convicted of
conspiracy to launder money. The district court enhanced his sentence
for abuse of trust based on his status as a pastor.4 35 In reversing, the
Eleventh Circuit stated that defendant's position as a pastor was
"insufficient to support a determination that [defendant] occupied a
position of trust with respect to the victims."

436

The court explained

that in fraud cases, the two situations in which a position of trust exists
are: "'(1) where the defendant steals from his employer, using his
position in the company to facilitate the offense, and (2) where a

428. Id. at 1230.
429. Id.
While a career offender's criminal history category is always Category VI, § 4Bl.1
indicates that with respect to the defendant's offense level, as distinguished from
his criminal history category, "ii]f an adjustment from § 3El.1 (Acceptance of
Responsibility) applies, [a court must] decrease the offense level by the number
of levels corresponding to that adjustment."
Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.1) (emphasis supplied by court).
430. Id.
431. Id. (quoting United States v. Koonce, 991 F.2d 693, 698 (11th Cir. 1993); (citing
United States v. Johnson, 155 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1998)).
432. Id.
433.
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434. 349 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003).
435. Id. at 1324.
436. Id.

§ 3B1.3 (2002).
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fiduciary or personal trust relationship exists with other entities, and
the defendant takes advantage of the relationship to perpetrate or
conceal the offense.'" 4 7 The facts of this case could only fall under the
second situation.4 3 Because there was no fiduciary relationship, the
applicability of the second situation depended on whether there was a
personal trust relationship between the defendant and the victims." 9
The court noted that the victims were not church members, and that
there was no evidence of a pastor-clergy relationship."'
"Although
[defendant] may have used his status as a pastor to develop the trust of
investors, this does not demonstrate that [defendant] created a personal
trust relationship with any of the victims." 4 41 The court noted that
there was no evidence from the testimony of the victims that defendant's
status as a pastor played a role in their investment decision; they just
wanted to "double their money."" 2 The court therefore remanded for
resentencing.443
In Poirier4" the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the enhancement for
abuse of a position of trust under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.3 without much
discussion."8 Defendant based his challenge to the enhancement on
the fact that although he was hired to give the county independent
financial advice, he did not have the authority to make the "final"
decision on the award of the county's business."'
The Eleventh
Circuit found that this fact was not determinative: "Fulton County hired
[defendant] to serve as a fair and unbiased financial advisor and put him
in a position to do that. With that position came Fulton County's trust,
and [defendant] clearly abused it. The enhancement for abusing a
position of trust was appropriate."" 7

437. Id. (quoting United States v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 831, 837-38 (11th Cir. 1998)).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1325-26.
441. Id. at 1325.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1326.
444. Poirieris discussed further under Chapter Two, Part B, regarding the interaction
of U.S.S.G. section 2B4.1 (Bribery) and U.S.S.G. section 2F1.1 (Fraud), at supra notes 14151; Chapter Three, Part B, regarding the role adjustment, at supra notes 433-47; and
Chapter Three, Part C, regarding obstruction of justice, at infra notes 448-97.
445. 321 F.3d at 1033.
446. Id.
447. Id.
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C.

Part C: Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice
The Eleventh Circuit examined U.S.S.G. section 3C 1.1, which provides
for a two-level enhancement if the defendant obstructs or impedes the
administration of justice, in six published decisions in 2003.4" Most
of these cases dealt with the defendant providing false testimony or
information during the district court proceedings. Although the cases
involved some general similarities, the individual differences resulted in
different outcomes.
449
For example, in United States v. Hasner,
the Eleventh Circuit
agreed that the enhancement is justified if the defendant committed
perjury. 45° Nonetheless, the court rejected the Government's appeal of
the district court's refusal to apply the enhancement despite the
Government's claim that the defendant lied under oath about three
specific, material matters at trial.45 ' "Although the government was
able to impeach [defendant's] testimony, we cannot say that the
inconsistencies required an upward adjustment." 4 2 The Eleventh
Circuit explained that it was not in as good of a position as the district
court to determine if the defendant committed perjury because it was
relegated to a "cold, paper record."453 The district court, on the other
hand, "is uniquely suited to make such a determination because it heard
all the evidence and was able to observe
a particular witness' demeanor
45 4
and behavior on the witness stand."
In a somewhat similar vein, the Eleventh Circuit declared in United
States v. Banks4 . that it was "not a fact finding body."455 However,

448. U.S.S.G. section 3C1.1 provides:
If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or
impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the
obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant's offense of conviction and any
relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2
levels.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2002).
449. 340 F.3d 1261 (UlthCir. 2003). Hasneris also in the section of this Article related
to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C 1.3 (Conflict of Interest; Payment or Receipt
of Unauthorized Compensation), at supra notes 171-84.
450. 340 F.3d at 1277 (citing United States v. Hubert, 138 F.3d 912, 915 (11th Cir.
1998)).
451. Id. at 1276-77.
452. Id. at 1277.
453. Id.
454. Id. (quoting United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991)).
455. 347 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2003).
456. Id. at 1271.
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unlike in Hasner, the court in Banks did not affirm the district
court.457

Rather, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence and

remanded the case for specific findings. 458 Defendant in Banks lied
about his true name to law enforcement during the course of the
investigation, concealed his extensive criminal history, bonded out of
custody under a false name, and committed new crimes while on
bond. 459 The commentary to section 3C1.1 states that the giving a
false name or identification at arrest will not ordinarily warrant the
obstruction enhancement "except where such conduct actually resulted
in a significant hindrance to the investigation or prosecution of the
instant offense."4"'
In applying the obstruction enhancement based on a defendant giving
a false name at arrest, Eleventh Circuit en banc precedent requires that
the sentencing court explain how the giving of the false name "'significantly hindered the prosecution or investigation of the offense.'" 46 '
The district court in Banks gave no such explanation.4 62 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that it could not proceed with appellate
review until after the sentencing court made findings as required by
section 3C1.1 and Eleventh Circuit precedent.4 "For these reasons,
we hold that it is not enough for the sentencing court to adopt the
uncontested portions of the PSR, hear the defendant's objections and the
arguments of counsel, and recite its agreement with 4the arguments of
the prosecutor and the recommendation of the PSR." 6
Notwithstanding this holding, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded to
discuss and reject the Government's argument that even without
findings, the record supported the enhancement. 465 The court explained that "neither [defendant's] intent to obstruct justice, nor the
potential that [the defendant] may have evaded investigation or
prosecution, can constitute a significant hindrance because application
note 5(a) explicitly states that the conduct must have 'actually resulted'
in a hindrance."4 66 Additionally, the court pointed out that the record

457. Id. at 1271-72.
458. Id. at 1272.
459. Id. at 1268.
460. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt. n.5(a) (2002).
461. 347 F.3d at 1269 (quoting United States v. Alpert, 28 F.3d 1104, 1108 (11th Cir.
1996) (en banc)).
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. (citing Alpert, 28 F.3d at 1108).
465. Id. at 1270-71.
466. Id. at 1270 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt. n.5(a)
(2002)).
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left the court to speculate about whether the conduct had impeded the
investigation or prosecution.4"7 "To show that [defendant's] conduct
actually resulted in a hindrance, the government must demonstrate how
it fruitlessly spent investigation or prosecution resources due to
[defendant's] untruthfulness."4 6
This, the government had not
done.4 69 Moreover, the court determined that defendant's commission
of other crimes while out on bond was not proof of hindrance of the
offense of conviction, noting that defendant was actually apprehended as
a result of his commission of these crimes.47 ° The court therefore
remanded the case for resentencing.47 '
In Poirier the Government appealed the district court's refusal to
apply the obstruction enhancement based on false testimony.472
Noting that the standard for reviewing the district court's obstruction
determination is clear error, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it would
"not find clear error unless our review of the record leaves us 'with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'"4 73
Unlike in Hasner,the court in Poirierfound that this high standard was
met because the defendants falsely testified at trial and before the
Securities and Exchange Commission and encouraged another person to
testify falsely.474 "In the face of all this evidence of obstruction, the
sentencing court, without further explanation, simply said: 'I find there
is no willful attempt by either defendant to obstruct the investigation,
nothing in the defendants' conduct that would warrant an obstruction
adjustment, so there will be no enhancement.'"47 '
The Eleventh
Circuit thus ruled that the district court's "inexplicable finding that
defendants did not obstruct
justice [was] clearly erroneous, and must be
476
corrected on remand."

467. Id.
468. Id. at 1271.
469. Id. at 1271 n.3.
470. Id. at 1271.
471. Id. at 1272.
472. 321 F.3d at 1035-36. Poirieris discussed further under Chapter Two, Part B,
regarding the interaction of U.S.S.G. section 2B4.1 (Bribery) and U.S.S.G. section 2F1.1
(Fraud), at supra notes 141-51; Chapter Three, Part B, regarding the role and abuse of
position of trust adjustments, at infra notes 433-47.
473. Id. (citing Coggin v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir. 1996), quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
474. Id.
475. Id. at 1036.
476. Id.
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The obstruction enhancement in Freixas477 was also based on false
testimony.47 When defendant pleaded guilty, she swore that she was
guilty, was pleading guilty voluntarily, and understood the potential
sentence she faced.479 Thereafter, she attempted to withdraw her plea,
claiming that she was not guilty, had pleaded guilty at the behest of her
attorney, and had done so only because of mistaken advice by counsel.480 "Simply stated, one of these accounts necessarily was dishonest,
and the district court acted well within its discretion in crediting the
former and discrediting [defendant's] later disavowal of the voluntariness and intelligence of her guilty plea.""' Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error in the sentencing court's
determination
that defendant provided materially false information to
42
the court.

In United States v. Patti,48 the district court applied the obstruction
enhancement on three grounds.'
The Eleventh Circuit found that
two of the grounds independently supported the enhancement, thereby
making it unnecessary to address the third ground, which related to
defendant's statements to the media.48 5
The first ground for the obstruction enhancement in Patti was
defendant's willful feigning of incompetence, which postponed the trial
and made the Government waste time and resources evaluating
defendant's competency."6 The Eleventh Circuit found that willfully
faking incompetence in order to postpone trial and punishment is a
proper basis for the obstruction enhancement and does not chill
defendant's willingness to raise competency issues. 4 7
The second ground for the obstruction enhancement was defendant's
involvement in an attempted arson at his accountant's office, which was
intended to destroy documents relevant to the tax fraud.4 s In upholding this ground for the enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit rejected

477. Freixasis also discussed in the portion of this Article analyzing cases addressing
mitigating roles under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.2, at supra notes 415-32.
478. 332 F.3d at 1321.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Patti is discussed in the portion of this Article dealing with tax loss calculations
under Chapter Two, Part T, at supra notes 348-63.
484. 337 F.3d at 1324.
485. Id. at 1324-25 n.13.
486. Id. at 1325.
487. Id. (citing United States v. Greer, 158 F.3d 228, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1998)).
488. Id.
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defendant's claim that the district court based its ruling on unreliable
hearsay, that being, the testimony of one of the co-conspirators in the
arson.489 Reliable hearsay may be considered at sentencing "'as long
as the evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability, the court makes
explicit findings of fact as to credibility, and the defendant has an
opportunity to rebut the evidence.' 4 9 ° Finding that the district court
properly relied on the co-conspirator's testimony about the arson, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the application of the obstruction of justice
enhancement under section 3C 1.1.491
The enhancement in the final obstruction case-United States v.
Rubio492-was founded on defendant's assault of a Government witness
following trial in retaliation for that witness's cooperation with the
Government during the investigation and trial. 493 Defendant argued
that the assault did not obstruct or impede the investigation or
prosecution of his case because it occurred after trial. 494 The Eleventh
Circuit responded that the commentary to section 3C1.1 "authorizes
enhancement based upon any conduct which is prohibited by the
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
obstruction of justice provisions of Title 18.
§ 1513(b), "inflicting bodily injury on a witness with the intent to
retaliate against that witness" is such prohibited conduct.496 Hence,
the district court did not err in applying the section 3C1.1 enhancement.497

489. Id. at 1325-26.
490. Id. at 1326 (quoting United States v. Anderton, 136 F.3d 747, 751 (11th Cir.
1998)).
491. Id.
492. 317 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2003).
493. Id. at 1244-45.
494. Id. at 1244.
495. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(i) (2002)).
496. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (2000)).
497. Id. at 1244-45. The Eleventh Circuit reflected that even if the district court had
erred, it would have been harmless because defendant was sentenced as a career offender,
which raised his offense level to level thirty-four and made the obstruction enhancement
irrelevant. Id. at 1245. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court
departed upward based on defendant's obstruction of justice because the career offender
enhancement negated the impact of the obstruction enhancement. Id. The departure was
based on U.S.S.G. section 5K2.0, "which authorizes such a departure if the sentencing court
finds an aggravating factor not adequately taken into consideration" by the Sentencing
Commission. Id. at 1245 n.2 (quoting United States v. Regueiro, 240 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th
Cir. 2001)). Defendant did not appeal that departure. Id.
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PartD: Multiple Counts

In United States v. Williams,498 the court detailed the rules for
grouping when there are multiple offenses of conviction.49 Generally
speaking, "related charges" should be grouped together, which will result
in a lower sentence than that which results when "charges arising from
separate incidents" are grouped separately. 0 0 "As a matter of law, a
conspiracy to commit a substantive offense will almost always have the
same victims as the commission (or attempted commission) of that
substantive offense, and so the two should almost always be grouped
together under § 3D1.2."5 01 The court explained that "[tihis result is
essentially mandated by the commentary to the guidelines, which states,
'When one count charges a conspiracy or solicitation and the other
charges a substantive offense that was the sole object of the conspiracy
or solicitation,
the counts will be grouped together under subsection
50 2
(b).'
According to the district court in Williams, the conspiracy to rob an
armored car and the attempt to rob that armored car required separate
grouping because two different guards were wounded during the
offense.50 3 The presentence report reasoned that one guard was the
victim for the conspiracy and the other guard was the victim of the
substantive offense. 5°4 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this reasoning
and reversed. 55
The Eleventh Circuit's decision hinged on the victim analysis.50 6
The court explained that the conspiracy and the attempt to rob the
armored car could not be grouped together as the "same act or transaction" under U.S.S.G. section 3D1.2(a) because "a conspiracy is formed
prior to the underlying offense it concerns and in a place other than
where that offense is to be committed." ' However, the court found
that the conspiracy and the attempt could be grouped under section

498. 340 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2003). In addition to the discussion of the grouping rules,
the court's in-depth analysis of the standards of review in sentencing appeals is well worth
reading. See id. at 1234-44.
499. Id. at 1234-44.
500. Id. at 1233.
501. Id. at 1245.
502. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2, cmt. n.4 (2002)).
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 1244-45.
507. Id. at 1244.
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3D1.2(b) because they involve the "same victim" and were part of the
same "common plan or scheme."-"'
In concluding that both guards were the victims of both offenses, the
Eleventh Circuit referred to the guideline commentary, which stated:
"Generally, there will be one person who is directly and most seriously
affected by the offense and is therefore identifiable as the victim." 0 9
The court characterized this as a "broad generalization," as opposed to
an "inflexible rule," explaining that "[w]he[n] offenses such as the
robbery and conspiracy at issue here equally harm multiple people, the
guidelines do not force us to designate the 'one real victim.'"5 10
Rather, the primary purpose of the commentary is "to emphasize that
'secondary victims,' such as bystanders who may be traumatized at the
sight of a crime, should not be counted as victims when grouping
offenses under § 3D1.2." 1
In reversing the separate grouping of the offenses and remanding for
resentencing, the Williams court noted that "[i]f the Government wanted
to punish Williams separately for the harm he inflicted upon each
individual [guard], it should have included two aggravated assault or
Herein lies the
attempted murder counts in the indictment."512
important distinction between Williams and Torrealba,513 the other
2003 Eleventh Circuit case that applied the grouping rules in the context
of a conspiracy and substantive offense.
In Torrealbathe defendant kidnapped a mother and two children and
was convicted of conspiracy to commit hostage taking, substantive
hostage taking, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation
to a crime of violence.5 14 At sentencing the district court divided the
conspiracy offense into three distinct groups based on the three victims,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 1B1.2(d)1 5 and section 3D1.2.515 The

508. Id. at 1244-45.
509. Id. at 1245-46 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 3D1.2, cmt. n.2
(2002)).
510. Id. at 1246.
511. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2, cmt. n.2 (2002) ("The
term 'victim' is not intended to include indirect or secondary victims")).
512. Id. at 1245.
513. Torrealba is also discussed at length in connection with U.S.S.G. section 2A4.1:
Kidnapping, Abduction, Unlawful Restraint, at supra notes 91-107.
514. 339 F.3d at 1239.
515. U.S.S.G. section 1B1.2(d) provides that "[a] conviction on a count charging a
conspiracy to commit more than one offense shall be treated as if the defendant had been
convicted on a separate count of conspiracy for each offense that the defendant conspired
to commit." Id. at 1241 n.6 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 1B1.2(d)
(2002)).
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Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to address grouping under
1B1.2(d) because it concluded that section 3D1.2 authorized separate
grouping in this case. 17
Under section 3D1.2,
"a sentencing court may treat a conspiracy count as if it were several
counts, each one charging conspiracy to commit one of the substantive
offenses, when a defendant is convicted of conspiring to commit several
substantive offenses and also convicted of committing one or more of
the underlying substantive offenses." 18
In upholding the application of section 3D1.2 in Torrealba, the court
relied heavily on the existence of multiple kidnapping victims in deciding
that "a conspiracy to take several hostages is a conspiracy to commit
several substantive 'offenses' within the meaning of commentary note 8
to section 3D1.2."5 19 Thus, the court proclaimed, "whe[n] a conspiracy
involves multiple victims, the defendant should be deemed to have
conspired to commit an equal number of substantive offenses, and the
conspiracy count should be divided under § 3D1.2 into that same number
of distinct crimes for sentencing purposes." 2 °

516. U.S.S.G. section 3D1.2 provides, in pertinent part:
All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into
a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same harm within the meaning
of this rule:
(a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or transaction.
(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions
connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common
scheme or plan.
(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense
characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the
counts.
(d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount
of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of
aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and
the offense guideline is written to cover such behavior.
Id. at 1241 n.6 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 3D1.2 (2002)).
517. Id. at 1242-44.
518. Id. at 1242 (quoting United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1248 (11th Cir. 2002)).
519. Id.
520. Id. at 1243. The court quoted Application Note Eight as follows:
A primary consideration in this section is whether the offenses involve different
victims. For example, a defendant may stab three prison guards in a single
escape attempt. Some would argue that all counts arising out of a single
transaction or occurrence should be grouped together even when there are distinct
victims. Although such a proposal was considered, it was rejected because it
probably would require departure in many cases in order to capture adequately
the criminal behavior. Cases involving injury to distinct victims are sufficiently
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Part E: Acceptance of Responsibility

U.S.S.G. section 3E1.1(a) provides for a two-level sentence reduction
"[ilf the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for
his offense."521 An additional one-level reduction is authorized if the
defendant meets the criteria set forth in subsection (b),522 which was
not addressed in any published Eleventh Circuit decision in 2003. The
only Eleventh Circuit case to analyze section 3E1.1(a) in 2003 was
Rubio.123 Defendant in Rubio was sentenced to 327 months of imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession
with intent to distribute approximately one kilogram of cocaine. 524 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected each of defendant's challenges to that sentence,
including the claim that he accepted responsibility for his offense and
only proceeded to trial to contest the legal issue of the scope of the career
offender guideline.5 25 In affirming the district court's ruling that
defendant had not accepted responsibility for his acts, the Eleventh
Circuit observed that although the defendant initially offered to plead
guilty, he later withdrew that offer.52 "He put the government to its
proof and consistently attempted to minimize his role, despite videotaped
527
evidence to the contrary."
V.

A.

CHAPTER FOUR: CRIMINAL HISTORY AND CRIMINAL LIVELIHOOD

PartA: CriminalHistory

In accordance with U.S.S.G. section 4A1.1, "prior sentences" are
assigned a specified number of criminal history points depending on the
type of crime and the length of the sentence. 28 The total number of
criminal history points determine the defendant's criminal history
category, which is used in determining the sentencing range under the

comparable, whether or not the injuries are inflicted in distinct transactions, so
that each such count should be treated separately rather than grouped together.
Id. at 1242-43 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2, cmt. n.8 (2002)
(emphasis supplied by the court)).
521.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 3E1.1(a)

(2002).

522. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (2002).
523. 317 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2003). Rubio is also discussed in connection with U.S.S.G.
section 3C1.1 (obstruction of justice), at supra notes 448-97, and U.S.S.G. section 4B1.2

(criminal history calculations), at infra notes 528-52.
524. 317 F.3d at 1241 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841).
525. Id. at 1243-44.
526. Id. at 1244.
527. Id.
528. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 4Al.1 (2002).
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federal sentencing guidelines.5" The guidelines define "prior sentence"
as "any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication for guilt ... for
conduct not part of the instant offense.""' ° The commentary explains
that "[clonduct that is part of the instant offense means conduct that is
relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions of § 1B1.3
(Relevant Conduct)."53 ' The term "relevant conduct" is defined as
including, among other things, "all acts and omissions committed.., by
the defendant that occurred during the commission of the offense of
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting
to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense."" 2
In United States v. White,533 the Eleventh Circuit was called upon
to resolve a matter of first impression concerning the application of
When immigration
U.S.S.G. sections 1B1.3(a)(1) and 4A1.2(a)(1).
officials went to arrest defendant on the charge of being in the United
States illegally,5 35 defendant gave them a false name.5" 6 Law enforcement officers found identification bearing that same false name
when they searched defendant's apartment. This discovery led to
defendant's state conviction and sentence for giving false information to
the police. Defendant was also convicted in federal court for being in the
United States illegally.53 At sentencing the district court opined that
the state offense counted as a "prior sentence" for criminal history
purposes because it was not related to the federal case. The district
court based its opinion on the chronology of events recited above. 38
To determine whether the state sentence was a "prior sentence" that
counted for criminal history purposes, the Eleventh Circuit focused its
attention on whether defendant's conduct-giving a false name at the
time of arrest on the instant federal charge of being in the United States
illegally- constituted "'an action taken to avoid detection or responsibility for'" the instant federal offense.539 "Deciding whether an act was

529. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2 (2002).
530. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(a)(1) (2002).
531. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1 (2002).
532. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1) (2002) (emphasis added).
533. 335 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003).
534. Id. at 1316-17.
535. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2000).
536. 335 F.3d at 1315.
537. Id. at 1315-16.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 1317 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1) (2002)).
The court also addressed, for the first time, "the proper standard for reviewing a district
court's application of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 and § 1B1.3(a)(1) to the facts in light of Buford v.
United States, 532 U.S. 59, 121 S.Ct. 1276, 149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001)." Id. The court decided
that clear error review was appropriate because "[dieciding whether an act was committed
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committed 'in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for [an] offense' is almost always a question of fact. It requires the
sentencing judge to assess the defendant's intent for committing the
additional crime."' °
In vacating the sentence, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the
sentencing court's chronological account did not allow the court "to make
any inferences about [the defendant's] intent, which is the relevant
inquiry in deciding whether the state false-information crime was an
attempt to avoid detection for the federal crime."5 4' The court emphasized that the federal crime at issue was "being in"-not just entering-the United States.14' Thus, the focus had to be on whether
defendant gave a false name to law enforcement "to avoid detection for
being in the United States."5" Based on the facts of the case, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court clearly erred in
answering this question in the negative. 5" Thus, the state conviction
was relevant conduct, which meant it was not a "prior sentence" for
purposes of U.S.S.G. section 4A1.2(a)(1), and could not be counted in
5 45
calculating the defendant's criminal history.
In Hunter there was no question but that the prior sentences qualified
as "prior sentences" for purposes of U.S.S.G. section 4A1.2(a)(1). 5"
Rather, the focus of the decision in Hunter was whether, under U.S.S.G.
section 4A1.2(a)(2), each sentence counted separately or whether the
sentences could be treated as one sentence.1 7 "Prior sentences
imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted separately. Prior sentences
imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes
of § 4A1.1(a), (b), and (c)." 5 According to the commentary to section
4A1.2, "[pirior sentences are not considered related if they were for
offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant
is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second of-

'in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for [an] offense' is almost
always a question of fact." Id. at 1319.
540. Id. at 1319.
541. Id. at 1320.
542. Id.
543. Id. (emphasis added).
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. 323 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003). Hunter is also discussed in the sections of this
Article relating to relevant conduct (U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3), at
supra notes 3-29, and minor role (U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2), atsupra
notes 415-32.
547. 323 F.3d at 1323.
548. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2002).
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fense)."549 If, on the other hand, the offenses that led to the sentences
"(A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part of a single common
scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing," then
the prior sentences are considered related.55 °
Reflecting on the clarity of the commentary, the Eleventh Circuit
pointed out that "[i]n determining whether cases are related, the first
question is always whether the underlying offenses are separated by an
intervening arrest. This inquiry is preliminary to any consideration of
consolidated sentencing." "' Hence, even though the defendant was
sentenced for two offenses on the same day, those sentences were not
related because defendant was arrested for the two offenses on different
days.552
B.

Part B: Criminal Livelihood

1. U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.1: Career Offender. U.S.S.G. section
4B1.1 provides for significantly enhanced sentencing guidelines if the
defendant meets the following three criteria, which qualify him for
treatment as a career offender:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the
defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant
offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two
prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense."'
Examples of crimes of violence include:
"murder, manslaughter,
kidnaping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson,
extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. " " The test for determining whether other offenses are considered

549.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 4A1.2,

cmt. n.3 (2002).

550. Id.
551. 323 F.3d at 1322-23 (citing United States v. Duty, 302 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (11th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Gallegos-Gonzalez, 3 F.3d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Aguilera, 48 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1995)).
552. Id. at 1323. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the defendant's reliance on United
States v. Dorsey was misplaced because that case was based on a prior version of the
commentary to U.S.S.G. section 4A1.2. Id. Prior to 1991, Application Note Three
.arguably appeared to define all cases consolidated for sentencing as related." Id. at 1323
n.5. However, Note 3 was amended in 1991 to make it clear that sentences separated by
intervening arrests are never related. Id. (citing Gallegos-Gonzalez, 3 F.3d at 327-28 &
n.2).
553. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2002).
554.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

4B1.2, cmt. 1 (2002).
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crimes of violence is whether: "(1) such other offense has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
another; or (2) the conduct underlying the conviction involved the use
of explosives or, by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another."555
As a matter of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the court in
Rubio556 held that the offense of driving under the influence (DUI)
causing serious bodily injury is a crime of violence for purposes of the
career offender classification. 57 The court noted that several other
circuits had reached the same conclusion.5 ' Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit referred to its prior ruling that "DUI causing serious bodily
injury was a crime of violence under § 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act." 559
In United States v. Adams,5" defendant, who pleaded guilty to a
drug charge, was classified as a career offender based on two prior
convictions-in 1994 and 1997-for carrying concealed weapons.5 "'
Controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent classifies the offense of carrying
a concealed weapon as a crime of violence for career offender purposes. 562 While the majority opinion in Adams did not revisit that
precedent,56 3 the dissent questioned the wisdom and logic of that
precedent, noted the circuit split on the issue, and recommended that the
holdings, including all concealed weapon violations under the umbrella
of career offender analysis, be reviewed by this court en banc under a
plain error analysis."s Additionally, the dissent in Adams called for

555. Id.
556. Rubio is also discussed in connection with U.S.S.G. section 3C1.1 (obstruction of
justice), at supra notes 448-97, and U.S.S.G. section 3E1.1 (acceptance of responsibility),
at supra notes 521-27.
557. 317 F.3d at 1243.
558. Id. (citing United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1995)
(first-degree assault conviction for DUI causing serious injury); United States v. Jernigan,
257 F.3d 865, 866 (8th Cir. 2001) (negligent homicide while driving under the influence);
United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2000) (misdemeanor
offense of driving under the influence); United States v. Farnsworth, 92 F.3d 1001,
1008-09 (10th Cir. 1996) (killing a human being while driving under the influence).
559. Id. (citing Le v. U.S. Attorney General, 196 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999)).
560. 316 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2003).
561. Id. at 1197. The Eleventh Circuit issued published decisions in two cases entitled
United States v. Adams in 2003. United States v. David Adams, 329 F.3d 802, 803 (11th
Cir. 2003), is discussed in the section of this Article analyzing U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(b)(4),
at supra notes 231-44. The Adams involved in this career offender case is Bernard Adams.
562. Id. at 1197 (citing United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1372 (11th Cir. 1998)).
563. Id. at 1197 n.1.
564. Id. at 1199-1203 (Propst, J., dissenting).
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en banc review of the Eleventh Circuit precedent restricting downward
departures in career offender cases."'5
Once a defendant is properly classified as a career offender, little can
be done to ameliorate the severity of the ensuing sentence by way of
adjustments or departures. For example, although the sentence can still
be adjusted downward for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.
section 3E 1.1, a defendant who is sentenced as a career offender cannot,
as a matter of law, receive a minor role reduction in his sentencing
guidelines.5"
In Adams the district court invited Eleventh Circuit review of its
decision not to depart downward.5 67 The district court acknowledged
its discretion to depart downward when the defendant's criminal history
overrepresents the seriousness of his prior criminal offenses. However,
the district court declined to do so, expressing confusion over what the
appropriate standard was-i.e., should it compare the defendant's
criminal history to the "usual" defendant in category VI who has twelve
criminal history points, or to other career offenders who have less than
twelve points and only end up in category VI because of the career
offender status.5"
The Eleventh Circuit noted the general rule that if a district court
recognizes its authority to depart downward and chooses not to do so,
that decision is not reviewable on appeal." 9 Notwithstanding, the
Eleventh Circuit opted to review in this case because "while the district
court raised an interesting legal question, it was the wrong question to
ask on the facts of this case."57 ° The Eleventh Circuit never directly
answered the district court's interesting legal question; rather, the
appellate court explained that the district court erred in analyzing the
motion for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. section 5K2.0, instead
of U.S.S.G. section 4A1.3. 57 '
Because downward departures for
overrepresentation of criminal history are expressly authorized under
section 4A1.3, the district court should not have engaged in the unguided
departure analysis applicable to section 5K2.0 departures.57 "Unguided departures, which proceed under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, are those not
explicitly provided for in the Guidelines-i.e., they are departures for

565. Id. (Propst, J., dissenting).
566. See Jeter, 329 F.3d at 1230, which is discussed in connection with the minor role
adjustment under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.2, at supra notes 415-32.
567. 316 F.3d at 1197-98.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 1198.
570. Id.

571. Id. at 1198-99.
572. Id.
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cases falling outside the heartland created by, inter alia, the guided
departures established by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
Guidelines."573
Regardless of the incorrect analysis, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision to not depart, stating that the court could not
have departed under U.S.S.G. section 4A1.3 either because section 4A1.3
is concerned with "the pattern or timing of prior convictions."574
Defendant's 1994 and 1997 prior convictions were deemed not so remote
in time as to warrant a departure, especially in light of the presence of
intervening criminal behavior.575
VI.
A.

CHAPTER FIvE: DETERMINING THE SENTENCE

Part D: Supervised Release

In 2003 the Eleventh Circuit was called upon to review several
conditions of supervised release. U.S.S.G. section 5D1.3 contains four
classes of conditions of supervised release that a sentencing court may
impose: (1) the mandatory conditions set forth in section 5D1.3(a); (2) the
standard conditions recommended in section 5D1.3(c); (3) special
conditions in section 5D1.3(d) and (e); and (4) any other conditions that
a court may impose if the condition meets the requirements set forth in
section 5D1.3(b). 576
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the supervised release conditions
imposed in several cases were reasonable under the circumstances. For
example, in United States v. Zinn,577 the court affirmed the following
supervised release conditions, which were imposed on a defendant
convicted of possessing child pornography: (1) that the defendant submit
to polygraph testing, and (2) that the defendant obtain consent of the
probation office to be able to gain access to the Internet.5 7' Likewise,
in United States v. Taylor,579 the court ruled that it was reasonable to
require a defendant convicted of using the Internet to encourage persons
to engage in sexual activity with a minor to submit to the following
conditions of supervised release: (1) submission to polygraph testing, (2)
restrictions on Internet access, (3) registration as a sex offender, and (4)

573.
574.
United
575.

576.
577.
578.
579.

Id.
Id. at 1199 (citing United States v. Rucker, 171 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999);
States v. Phillips, 120 F.3d 227, 232 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Id.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3 (2002).
321 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1093-94.
338 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2003).
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a restriction on visiting places where children congregate."' Similarly,
in United States v. Veal, 8' the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a special
condition of supervised release for a defendant convicted of transporting
or shipping child pornography by computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(1), which required the defendant to register with the State
Sexual Offender Registration Agency.582
Not all conditions of supervised release survived Eleventh Circuit
scrutiny. In United States v. Ridgeway," the Eleventh Circuit held
that a condition of supervised release requiring a defendant who was
convicted of possessing an unregistered firearm to refrain from "conduct
or activities that would give reasonable cause to believe" that he had
violated any criminal law was uiduly vague and therefore not authorized by the Sentencing Guidelines. 8' Accordingly, the court vacated
this portion of the sentence.585
B.

Part G: Implementing the Total Sentence of Imprisonment

1. U.S.S.G. Section 5G1.2. In United States v. Davis,8 6 the court
answered a question of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit
regarding U.S.S.G. section 5G1.2(d).587 That guideline states:
If the sentejce imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory
maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed
on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to
the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total
punishment. In all other respects sentences on all counts shall run
concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law. 8
Because the guidelines called for sentences that exceed the statutory
maximum under any one count, the district court sentenced the
defendants to consecutive sentences to achieve the applicable guideline
sentence, believing that it had no discretion to do otherwise.58 9
Defendants in Davis pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit had "never
directly addressed the question of whether the district court retains the

580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.

Id. at 1280-86.
322 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1278-79.
319 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1316-17.
Id.
329 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1252.

588.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAUAL

589. 329 F.3d at 1252.

§ 5G1.2(d)

(2002).
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discretion to sentence a defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment
when § 5G1.2(d) calls for consecutive terms of imprisonment." 590 The
Eleventh Circuit then took this opportunity to announce that it agreed
with the majority of the other circuits that had answered the question.59' As such, the court held that "the district court properly
interpreted [section] 5G1.2(d) to require the imposition of consecutive
sentences on Appellants whe[n] the sentence imposed on the [section]
841 count was less than the total punishment for Appellants' aggregate
convictions.""9 2 The court recognized that the circuits were still split
inasmuch as the Third and Fifth Circuits had ruled to the contrary.593
2. U.S.S.G. Section 5G1.3. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 5G1.3, the
federal district court can run a federal sentence concurrent or consecutive to an unimposed state sentence on a pending case. 594 This

590. Id. at 1253 (emphasis supplied by the court).
591. Id. (citing United States v. Diaz, 296 F.3d 680, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097, 1109 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kentz, 251 F.3d 835,
842 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518-19 (4th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2000)).
592. Id. at 1254.
593. Id. (citing United States v. Velasquez, 304 F.3d 237,242-43 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding
that the district court retained the discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3854 to run sentences
concurrently without departing even when section 5G1.2(d) applies); United States v.
Vasquez-Zamora, 253 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2001) (indicating that the application of
section 5G1.2(d) is discretionary)).
A few months after publishing Davis, the Eleventh Circuit issued United States v.
Pressley, 345 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2003), which noted and followed Davis. Pressley was
sentenced to 360 months imprisonment under U.S.S.G. section 5G1.2, which requires a
district court to run sentences consecutively in order to achieve the guidelines target
sentence, which, in this case, was 360 months to life. Pressley is discussed in more detail
in connection with departures under Chapter Five, Part K, at infra notes 608-42.
594. U.S.S.G. section 5G1.3 provides:
(a) If the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term
of imprisonment (including work release, furlough, or escape status) or after
sentencing for, but before commencing service of, such term of imprisonment, the
sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the
undischarged term of imprisonment.
(b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and a term of imprisonment resulted from
another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under
the provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)
and that was the basis for an increase in the offense level for the instant offense
under Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) or Chapter Three (Adjustments), the
sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed as follows:
(1) The court shall adjust the sentence for any period of imprisonment already
served on the undischarged term of imprisonment if the court determines that
such period of imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the
Bureau of Prisons; and
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guideline was addressed in two published Eleventh Circuit cases in
2003- United States v. Andrews5 9 and United States v. McDaniel.5
In Andrews defendant's supervised release was revoked and he was
resentenced to twenty-four months of imprisonment.59 ' The only issue
before the appellate court was "whether the district court had the
authority to impose the 24-month sentence as consecutive to any future
sentence imposed as a result of [the defendant's] underlying criminal
conduct."5 9 Recognizing a circuit split concerning whether a district
court has the authority to impose consecutive sentences for supervised
release and for the underlying criminal conduct,5" the Eleventh
Circuit held that it was bound to follow United States v. Ballard. °°
In Ballard the court upheld a consecutive federal sentence that was
imposed consecutively to an anticipated state sentence that had not yet
been imposed.6° ' The Eleventh Circuit refused to limit Ballard to its
facts, ruling that under Ballard, the sentencing court had the authority
to impose consecutive sentences and did not abuse its discretion in doing
so here. °2 The court explained, however, that the state court still
retains the power in this scenario to effectively overrule the federal
court's decision. 0 3
By this opinion, we conclude only that the federal court may control
the federal sentence and whether a defendant will receive federal credit
for the time served on his state sentence ....

The fact that the federal

district court elected to sentence Andrews to a consecutive federal

(2) The sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the
remainder of the undischarged term of imprisonment.
(c) (Policy Statement) In any other case involving an undischarged term of
imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense may be imposed to run
concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged
term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.
U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.3 (2002).

595. 330 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2003).
596. 338 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
597. 330 F.3d at 1307-08.
598. Id. at 1306 (emphasis supplied by the court).
599. Id. (comparing Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2000) (district
court does not have such authority); United States v. Quintero, 157 F.3d 1038 (6th Cir.
1998) (same); United States v. Clayton, 927 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1991) (same), with United
States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2000) (district courts do have such authority);
United States v. Williams, 46 F.3d 57 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Salley v. United States, 786
F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1986) (same)).
600. 6 F.3d 1502, 1504-10 (11th Cir. 1993).
601. 330 F.3d at 1306-07.
602. Id. at 1307.
603. Id. at 1307 n.1.
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sentence by no means limits the sentencing options available to the
state court. 6°4
The Eleventh Circuit recognized its decisions in Ballard and Andrews
in deciding McDaniel." The court in McDaniel held that the district
court erred in ruling that it did not have the discretion to order the
defendant's sentence to run concurrently with an unimposed sentence on
pending state charges.'3
Because the district court did have the
authority to make a federal sentence concurrent to a state sentence not
yet imposed for pending state charges, the sentence was vacated and the
case was remanded for resentencing. °7
C.

PartK: Departures

The Eleventh Circuit departure decisions were unremarkable in 2003.
The court iterated its oft-repeated rule that it will "not review a district
court's refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court
mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a
departure."0 ' That rule rang the death knell for the defendant in
Torrealba, °9 who appealed the district court's refusal to depart
downward under U.S.S.G. section 5K2.0 "based on the extensive physical
and sexual abuse that he suffered during his childhood at the hands of
...
his co-conspirator and the apparent mastermind of the kidnaping
plot.""'0
The district court acknowledged that it could depart, but
stated that it would be inappropriate to do so under the facts of the
case.6 1 ' 2 This ended any appellate review of Torrealba's departure
61
claim.

604. Id.
605. 338 F.3d at 1287-88 (citing Andrews, 330 F.3d 1305; Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502).
606. Id.
607. Id. at 1288.
608. Torrealba, 339 F.3d at 1247 (quoting United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217,
1256 (11th Cir. 2001), citing United States v. Mignott, 184 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir.
1999)). See also Adams, 316 F.3d at 1197-99, which is discussed in connection with
Chapter Four departures in the context of a career offender classification, at supra notes
553-75.
609. 339 F.3d at 1247.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Id. In a related context, the court observed that "[tihe application of§ 3742(a) and
the restraints it places on review of downward departure decisions is at most a collateral
consequence of a guilty plea, just as it is at most a collateral consequence of conviction
after trial." United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). Indeed,
there appears to be no Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court case that "requires a district
court to inform the defendant during a guilty plea colloquy that he may or will be unable
to appeal any refusal by the court to depart downward at sentencing." Id.
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In two other cases, the court agreed to review the denial of the
downward departure motions because the district court failed to
recognize its authority to depart. For example, in Anderson, the court
agreed with the defendant that the district court rejected the downward
departure based on an erroneous belief that it lacked the authority to
depart.113 Although the district court judge said he did not think a
prima facie case had been made for departure, which was not reviewable
on appeal, the judge also opined that he lacked the authority to grant
the departure.614 "This statement opens the door to appellate review."6 15 The Government conceded that the district court was
incorrect in its belief that it could not depart. 16 Nonetheless, the
Government asked the court to affirm because, it argued, the departure
was not warranted. Defendant, on the other hand, asked the court to
order the district court to grant the departure. 17 The Eleventh Circuit
accepted neither proposal. 16 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit expressed
no view on the merit of the departure motion; it simply remanded the
case to allow the district court to make the decision.619
The Eleventh Circuit also reversed, in part, a district court's determination that it lacked authority to depart from the sentencing guidelines
range in Pressley.62 ° Pressley was sentenced to a total of 360 months
of imprisonment because consecutive sentences were imposed under
U.S.S.G. section 5G1.2 in order to achieve the sentence called for under
the applicable guidelines, which was 360 months to life.6 2' Pressley
raised three grounds for downward departure: (1) the guidelines
sentence overstated the seriousness of his drug offense; (2) the conditions
of his presentence confinement were harsh; and (3) consecutive sentences
resulting in more jail time than the statutory maximum violate the
spirit of Apprendi.622

613. 326 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2003). There are two published Anderson decisions in
the Eleventh Circuit in 2003. The Anderson decision discussed here, in connection with
departures, was also discussed in earlier in this article in connection with Chapter Two,
Part X: Conspiracies, at supra notes 364-80.
614. 326 F.3d at 1332.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 1332-33.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. 345 F.3d 1205, 1213-15 (11th Cir. 2003). Pressley was discussed earlier in this
article in connection with U.S.S.G. section 5G1.2, at supra notes 620-36.
621. 345 F.3d at 1208.
622. Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).
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After finding the district court believed that it lacked the authority to
grant a departure, the court had to determine whether the district
court's belief was based on legal error.623 "Deciding whether the
district court was correct in a belief that it did not have authority to
depart requires us to locate the boundaries of the district court's
departure authority."6 24 The Eleventh Circuit noted that a decision to
depart is threefold. 2 5 First, the court must determine whether the
facts take the case out of the heartland. 26 Second, it must decide
whether the proposed ground was adequately taken into account by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 6 27 Third, the
court must resolve whether the facts sufficiently exhibit a departure
factor to support a departure. 8
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that "imposing consecutive
sentences on the various counts would violate the spirit of Apprendi,"
especially given that the court had determined that Apprendi does not
apply to the guidelines.6 29 Citing Davis, the court in Pressley reaffirmed that "imposition of consecutive sentences under section 5G1.2(d)
is mandatory," although a "court may decline to impose consecutive
sentences, even when required by section 5G1.2, if there are grounds for
departing from the guidelines sentence."63 ° Nonetheless, the court
found no such ground for departure under the facts of this case. 1
"We therefore hold that the mere operation of section 5G1.2 to increase
guidelines' range, without
the available aggregate sentence up to the
62
more, does not render the case atypical." 1
Likewise, the court rejected the argument that the sentence overstated
the seriousness of defendant's crime because he was not a drug kingpin
and the counts of conviction aggregated drug quantities in which he
dealt over a period of time.63 3 Even assuming this could be a proper
ground for departure, the court found that the defendant had not
established that the factor was present to an exceptional degree. 3 4

623. Id. at 1209.
624. Id.
625. Id. at 1209-11.
626. Id. at 1209.
627. Id. at 1210-11.
628. Id. at 1211.
629. Id. at 1213.
630. Id. at 1213-14 (citingDavis, 329 F.3d at 1253-54; United States v. Perez, 956 F.2d
1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1992)).
631. Id.
632. Id. at 1215.
633. Id. at 1215-18.
634. Id.
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However, the court held that the six years defendant spent in presentence confinement in a twenty-three-hour-a-day lockdown were
"extraordinary" and provided a justifiable basis for departure." 5 The
court therefore remanded the case to give the district court an opportunity to exercise its discretion in determining whether to depart in light of
the severity of the presentence confinement conditions. 6
Unlike the courts in the other departure cases noted above, the district
court in United States v. Maung 7 granted a downward departure for
an alien from Burma to bring the sentence-for exporting stolen
This sentence would not make defendant
cars-under one year.6
ineligible for asylum or face deportation to a country where, as a
political refugee, he faced torture.3 9 In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that contrary to the testimony of defendant's expert witness, the
reduction in defendant's sentence would not automatically make him
Although the district court
ineligible for withholding of removal."s
was correct in believing that a sentence of more than one year would
make the defendant ineligible for asylum, the Eleventh Circuit declared
that this was not a valid basis for a downward departure."' Holding
that "a sentencing court may not depart downward for the purpose of
taking a crime out of the definition of an aggravated felony in order to
shield the defendant from the immigration consequences Congress has
decided should follow from commission of such crimes," the court in
Maung reversed the sentence and remanded with instructions to
resentence the defendant without the downward departure. 42

635. Id. at 1218-19.
636. Id.
637. 320 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2003).
638. Id. at 1307.
639. Id.
640. Id. at 1307-08 & n.1.
641. Id. at 1308-10. The court dismissed as "dicta" caselaw recognizing alienage as a
possible basis for departure. Id.
642. Id. at 1309-10. In so ruling, the court added one more thought:
The effect of permitting a downward departure on these grounds would be to favor
aliens with more lenient sentences than citizens of this country who commit the
same crime and have the same criminal history. That result would be more than
a little odd especially since, in the only instances where they speak to the
difference at all, the guidelines provide that harsher sentences should be imposed
upon aliens in some circumstances.
Id. at 1309.
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CONCLUSION

The number of issues of first impression that arose in the Eleventh
Circuit in 2003 is no doubt related, in large part, to the number of recent
guideline amendments. Additional amendments to the guidelines,
particularly guidelines implemented pursuant to the Protect Act, ensure
that the cycle of interpretation, discrepancy, and guideline amendment
will continue in the future. From a jurisprudential perspective, this
continuing saga guarantees that the guidelines will be a predominant
source of future litigation in the Eleventh Circuit.

